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TAX LAW UNCERTAINTY AND THE ROLE OF 
TAX INSURANCE 
Kyle D. Logue· 
In the broadest sense, this is an article about legal or regulatory 
uncertainty and the role that private and public insurance can play in 
managing it. More narrowly, the article is about tax law enforcement 
and the familiar if ill-defined distinctions between tax evasion, tax 
avoidance, and abusive tax avoidance. Most specifically, the article is 
about a new type of tax risk insurance policy, sometimes called tax 
indemnity insurance or transactional tax risk insurance that provides 
coverage against the risk that the Internal Revenue Service (Service) 
will disallow a taxpayer-insured's tax treatment of a particular 
transaction. The question is whether this type of insurance coverage 
increases incentives for illegitimate tax avoidance or, alternatively, 
provides needed certainty to taxpayers - certainty that the Service is 
not able or willing to provide. Should tax insurance be banned? 
Encouraged? Ignored? To what extent should the government, instead 
of commercial insurance companies, provide such legal uncertainty 
insurance directly, either by increasing the use of private rulings or by 
selling the equivalent of tax indemnity insurance policies? On the 
question of commercially provided tax indemnity insurance, the article 
concludes that the appropriate regulatory response is probably (a) to 
allow the purchase of policies (and perhaps in some situations to 
subsidize their purchase) but (b) to compel taxpayers who purchase 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. My thanks to Reuven Avi-Yonah, 
Steven Bank, Victor Fleischer, Jason Furman, David Hasen, Ed Kleinbard, Daniel 
Shaviro, Joel Slemrod, Kirk Stark and the participants at the NYU Colloquium on 
Tax Policy and Public Finance, the UCLA Tax Policy and Public Finance Workshop, 
and the University of Virginia Legal Theory Workshop for extremely useful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Funding for this research was generously 
provided by the Cook Fund at the University of Michigan Law School, and much of 
the work on the article was completed while I was in residence at the University of 
Virginia School of Law. 
339 
340 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 25:339 
such policies to disclose this fact to the Service. Such a response allows 
the use of tax risk insurance as a supplement to private letter rulings 
while at the same time minimizing the possibility that the insurance will 
be sold to cover pure "detection risk." 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical transactions and the tax law 
uncertainty that each contains:1 
Example One: Ms. A is contemplating making a sizeable 
investment in an existing partnership. In the course of her 
due diligence investigation, Ms. A discovers a large potential 
tax issue. Ms. A's tax advisor tells her that if the Service 
detects and raises the issue on audit, she would probably 
prevail in court, but that a favorable outcome is not certain. 
The law in question is not crystal clear in its application to the 
particular circumstances of this partnership, and thus there is 
some significant possibility of losing on the merits if it comes 
to that. Moreover, if the issue is detected and raised by the 
Service, the cost of litigating the question will be substantial. 
Because of these uncertain contingencies, Ms. A is reluctant 
to proceed. 
Example Two: B Corp, a publicly traded corporation, would 
like to spin off its subsidiary C to B's shareholders for non tax 
business reasons. However, C is a very valuable company, 
and B's basis in C's stock is low; therefore, B would, if 
possible, like to structure the transaction to qualify as a tax­
free spin-off under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 
355. The problem is that there is some risk the Service (and 
in turn a court) will conclude that the transaction was not in 
fact motivated primarily by a nontax business purpose but 
was rather a mere device for avoiding taxes and will thus 
disallow the tax-free treatment. If that were to happen, B 
would incur a huge tax liability from the capital gain on the 
transaction. To resolve this legal uncertainty, B sought a 
private letter ruling from the Service that the spin-off would 
qualify under section 355, but the Service refused to issue the 
requested ruling because the question of whether B has a 
nontax business purpose for the spin-off is too "fact 
intensive." B's outside tax counsel has provided a legal 
opinion confirming that the transaction should qualify for tax-
1 The first four hypotheticals are taken from an article about tax indemnity 
insurance by a tax practitioner. See generally Richard A. Wolfe, Tax Indemnity 
Insurance: A Valuable and Evolving Tool for Managing Tax Risks, 598 PLl!fAX 595, 
604-16 (2003). 
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free treatment; this opinion reduces almost to zero the 
likelihood of penalties should the Service disagree. However, 
given the magnitude of the corporate-level gain involved, B is 
nevertheless reluctant to go forward with the deal. 
Example Three: D Corp is a holding company that owns a 
number of subsidiary corporations, including T Corp, which 
happens to be D's only profitable operation at the moment. 
D is in dire financial straits and needs to raise capital to 
survive. Accordingly, D decides to sell T to the highest 
bidder. P is interested in buying T from D; in the course of 
conducting its due diligence, however, P discovers that D has 
a significant potential federal income tax issue unrelated to T, 
an issue that involves hundreds of millions of federal tax 
dollars that has not yet been detected by the Service. 
Although P's tax counsel is of the view that D's position with 
respect to this tax issue is probably correct on the merits, 
there is considerable uncertainty on this point, and the 
Service (and a court) might well take a less favorable view. P 
is concerned that (i) the issue may well be detected and D's 
reporting position will be rejected by the Service; (ii) if 
detected, there is some nontrivial possibility that the 
government will prevail; and (iii) if the government were to 
prevail, D, because of its dire financial position, might not be 
able to satisfy the taxes that would arise, potentially leaving T 
on the hook for the taxes under the consolidated return 
regulations.2 
Example Four: E Corp is a publicly traded corporation that is 
currently being audited by the Service. Indeed, like many 
large corporations, E is virtually under constant audit. The 
Service agents have indicated to E that they are considering 
issuing a thirty-day letter with respect to a significant tax issue 
involving E's return. E believes the agents' position has 
limited merit, but E is aware that if the agents issue the thirty­
day letter, because of the magnitude of the potential tax, E 
will have to publicly disclose that fact and establish an 
accounting reserve for the potential tax liability. P is 
concerned that this disclosure will adversely affect its share 
price. 
2 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-6 (2002). 
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These examples represent a much larger phenomenon: 
sophisticated taxpayers who are considering engaging in some sort of 
business transaction but face substantial uncertainty as to how the tax 
laws will be applied to their particular transaction. It is easy to 
understand how such uncertainty might deter a risk-averse taxpayer 
from engaging in welfare-enhancing, wealth-creating transactions, 
which would obviously be a bad thing, especially if the uncertainty in 
question could feasibly be eliminated or reduced. One might surmise 
that the natural solution to the problem of tax law uncertainty would 
be for the government - either Congress or the Treasury 
Department - to clarify the law in advance so that such uncertainty 
does not exist. It simply is not possible, however, to eliminate 
substantive tax law uncertainty for every conceivable business 
transaction. No matter how long and detailed the tax laws become 
(and they presently span over 10,000 pages of code and regulations), 
there will always be gaps; there will always be transactions or activities 
whose proper tax treatment is uncertain. Another solution might be 
to have the government on a case-by-case basis provide insurance 
against tax law uncertainty in the form of private letter rulings issued 
directly to taxpayers - in effect, guaranteeing with some limitations a 
particular tax treatment for a particular transaction. As it turns out, 
however, the Service is not always willing or able to provide such 
individualized assurance. 
A final alternative is the one on which this Article focuses: 
privately provided tax risk insurance.3 In recent years, insurance 
companies have begun to offer tax risk insurance policies - also 
called tax indemnity insurance policies (TIIPs) or transactional tax 
risk insurance - that provide taxpayers with coverage against the risk 
that the Service will reject a taxpayer's characterization of a particular 
transaction. These policies usually provide full indemnification for all 
tax-related losses, including back taxes, interest, and penalties. What 
sorts of tax risks can be insured against? Situations like the examples 
mentioned above have each been the basis of a tax risk insurance 
policy, as have many others.4 More importantly, the theoretical scope 
of tax risk insurance is large as is the potential market for regulatory 
uncertainty insurance more generally. For insurance markets to 
operate there need only be a significant amount of money at stake 
coupled with a significant amount of uncertainty. Thus, although tax 
3 Tax insurance goes by various names: tax liability insurance, tax indemnity 
insurance, and tax risk transactional insurance, to name a few. 
4 See Wolfe, supra note 1, at 604-06. 
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risk insurance is a recent development and is still only a niche market 
compared with the enormous market for commercial general liability 
insurance or professional malpractice insurance, and although it has 
not yet spread to other, nontax areas of regulatory uncertainty, it is 
not surprising to hear that there are reports that the tax indemnity 
insurance market is growing rapidly.5 It is only a matter of time 
before insurers begin considering nontax applications of regulatory 
uncertainty insurance. 
Interestingly, a decent argument can be made that there is 
nothing special, and nothing especially troublesome, about privately 
provided tax liability insurance, or regulatory uncertainty insurance 
more generally. The type of risk-shifting that occurs through a tax 
risk insurance policy is merely a natural extension of a type of 
contractual risk-shifting that has existed for a long time without much 
controversy: tax indemnity or tax allocation agreements between 
contracting parties. Such agreements, which are frequently, if not 
always, a part of corporate merger and acquisition transactions, 
regularly serve to allocate uncertain tax liabilities between or among 
the parties. For example, a tax indemnity agreement might shift a 
potential tax liability from a purchaser to a seller or vice versa. These 
indemnity agreements presumably shift the relevant legal risks to the 
less risk-averse party to the transaction. In any event, since tax 
indemnity agreements have existed for a while, the introduction of tax 
risk insurance marks a sort of natural evolution of tax indemnity 
agreements. With the introduction of this new insurance market, if 
one of the parties is risk-averse with respect to a tax law contingency 
involved in the deal, instead of just shifting the tax law uncertainty 
from buyer to seller or vice versa, that legal uncertainty can be moved 
from the contracting parties to a third-party insurance company whose 
business is assessing and distributing risks and who can therefore do 
so relatively efficiently. Viewed this way, tax risk insurance would 
seem to be neither more nor less objectionable than any other form of 
commercial liability insurance and should be left alone, or perhaps 
even encouraged in some way. ' 
There is, however, a less optimistic way to view tax risk insurance. 
To see this concern, imagine a final hypothetical: 
5 See, e.g. , Kenneth A. Gary, New Opportunity for Tax Lawyers: Insuring Tax 
Transactions, 104 TAX NOTES 26 (July 5, 2004) (describing the rapid recent growth of 
the tax insurance market). 
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Example Five: F Corp is a public corporation that is currently 
highly profitable but faces intense competition. F's chief 
executive officer (CEO) is continually under extreme 
pressure from shareholders, and from the capital markets 
generally, to increase after-tax earnings, and the pressure 
travels downstream. Every department in the corporation, 
including (somewhat counterintuitively) the tax department, 
is being urged to "deliver greater profits." For the past 
several years, F has paid large amounts of federal income tax 
to the government, to the chagrin of the CEO and 
shareholders. F's tax manager is feeling the heat and 
wondering whether his job with the company is secure. Then 
he is approached by XYZ Firm, an accounting/law firm that 
specializes in developing, marketing, implementing, and 
ultimately defending highly sophisticated tax shelter products. 
XYZ says it has a new shelter to offer F that relies on an 
ingeniously counterintuitive but literally plausible reading of 
several different provisions of the Code. According to XYZ, 
merely by engaging in a series of complicated transactions 
that have little real (i.e., nontax) economic significance and 
that involve an accommodating foreign corporation that is not 
subject to U.S. tax laws but is willing to assist for a price, F 
can in effect manufacture paper losses that will substantially 
reduce the company's U.S. corporate income tax liability. 
The catch is that, if this shelter is detected by the Service on 
audit, which is unlikely given the complexity of the 
transaction but nevertheless possible, the Service will 
certainly regard the transaction as a sham or as lacking 
significant nontax economic substance. Although a court may 
be persuaded to overturn the Service's determination and 
side with the taxpayer, the more likely outcome is that a court 
would side with the government given that the shelter in 
question relies on an interpretation of the law that is clearly 
contrary to congressional intent. In any event, the cost of 
litigating the case would be immense. Moreover, because of 
the aggressive nature of the tax position being recommended, 
large tax penalties are a possibility, despite the presence of a 
"more likely than not" opinion from a reputable tax counsel, 
assuming such an opinion can be secured. Given all of these 
uncertainties, F is reluctant to purchase the shelter product. 
345 
This hypothetical should be familiar to the readers of this journal 
and to anyone who has followed the problem of corporate tax shelters 
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in the tax and business presses. As has been well documented, 
sophisticated taxpayers confront powerful incentives to engage in 
what are sometimes called "abusive tax shelter" transactions.6 Indeed, 
the prevalence of abusive tax shelters, with the associated costs in 
terms of behavioral distortions and distributional inequities, is widely 
considered one of the most serious problems facing the administration 
of the income tax laws and is certainly one of the most written about 
topics in all of tax scholarship.7 The tax shelter problem will, in all 
likelihood, never go away entirely. So long as (i) there is a low 
probability that abusive shelters will be detected on audit, which 
seems likely always to be true; (ii) sophisticated taxpayers have the 
ability to avoid paying penalties by simply purchasing an appropriate 
opinion letter, or "penalty insurance," from a willing tax lawyer; and 
(iii) the penalties that are assessed in those cases in which the opinion 
letters are unavailing are relatively small, as has always been true, 
there will likely be a healthy market for tax shelters. If we add to this 
equation the possibility that even the small residual risk of incurring 
tax penalties might be entirely eliminated through the purchase of a 
tax risk insurance policy, a dramatically larger tax compliance 
problem potentially emerges. 
To see this point, imagine what would happen if XYZ Firm in 
Example Five above were to offer the following option with its new 
shelter product: If F Corp would agree to purchase and implement 
XYZ's newest shelter, XYZ would broker a deal with InsureCo to 
underwrite F's risk of having to pay back taxes, interest, and penalties 
in the event the shelter is discovered and rejected. Moreover, 
lnsureCo would also agree to cover the litigation costs to defend the 
shelter against the Service. F would need only to pay the insurance 
premium and agree to the terms in the contract. If such insurance 
6 The term "abusive tax shelter" is notoriously difficult to define. Unless 
otherwise specified, I use the term loosely to mean transactions that are primarily tax­
motivated and that rely for their tax advantages on a reading of the tax laws that is (a) 
technically legal (that is, not obviously illegal) but (b) more likely than not to be 
rejected by a court if examined on the merits. Many other definitions of tax shelters 
have been offered, some broader and some narrower than the one just stated. Some 
of these other definitions are mentioned below. 
7 See, e.g. , Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX 
NOTES 1775 (June 21, 1999); Foreword: Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 
TAX L. REV. 125, 125 (2002) ("In the tax community there is general (although not 
unanimous) agreement that corporate tax shelters pose a threat to the federal income 
tax system."); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX 
SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (1999), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/ctswhite.pdf. 
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were available, it would almost certainly be socially undesirable. 
Unlike insurance against legitimate legal uncertainty (that is, 
uncertainty as to how the law will be applied to particular situations) ,8 
this would be insurance against pure detection risk - that is, the risk 
of being caught - since the legal position being taken here is almost 
certainly not legal. The last thing we need is a new financial product 
that enables highly aggressive taxpayers to shift their risk of being 
detected to a risk-neutral insurer. Thus, although the tax indemnity 
insurance market may currently be a small scale operation in contrast 
to some other types of insurance, and may even presently be limited 
to transactions that do involve significant legal uncertainty, the 
market could expand or mutate to produce insurance policies that 
cover tax shelter transactions as well, thereby making an already 
difficult tax compliance problem far worse. This concern is not purely 
academic. There has already been some regulatory scrutiny directed 
at tax insurance arrangements precisely because of the concern about 
shelter insurance. For example, the Treasury Department considered 
but ultimately rejected making the purchase of a tax indemnity 
insurance policy sufficient grounds for triggering the tax shelter 
reporting requirement, which would have brought enhanced Service 
scrutiny on insured tax positions.9 
So which picture of tax risk insurance - the optimistic or the 
pessimistic one - is more accurate? Is tax insurance good or bad? It 
turns out that the best answer is that it depends. Under certain 
assumptions, a surprisingly strong case can be made for allowing -
8 Another term for substantive legal uncertainty in the tax context is "merits 
risk," as in the risk of losing the issue "on the merits" in the event that it is examined 
by a court. 
9 Treas. Reg. § l.6011-4(b)(4) (2004) (defining one class of "reportable 
transactions" - i.e., transactions that trigger special reporting requirements for the 
taxpayer - as those with "contractual protection" regarding the tax position in 
question, where "contractual protection" includes transactions with respect to which 
the taxpayer has secured a tax insurance policy). This language in the temporary 
regulations caused a stir among insurance companies who were concerned that 
making the purchase of tax insurance a trigger for tax-shelter reporting would prevent 
this fledgling insurance market from ever getting off the ground. See, e.g. , David S. 
De Berry, Insurance Group Comments on Tax Shelter Reporting Regs, TAX NOTES 
TODAY (Jan. 6, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 3-57) 
[hereinafter Insurance Group Comments] (comments of Dave De Berry of The 
Hartford Company, urging the Treasury Department to change proposed regulations 
to exclude the purchase of tax insurance as sufficient to trigger shelter-reporting 
requirements). The temporary regulation was superseded by a final set of regulations 
in T.D. 9046, 2003-1 C.B. 614, which still contains the contractual protection category 
of reportable transactions, but which omits any mention of tax insurance. 
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even encouraging - tax insurance, which as a form of insurance has 
much in common with run-of-the-mill liability or legal risk insurance. 
There is no denying, however, the danger inherent in this type of 
insurance. It is possible that the sort of tax indemnity insurance for 
run-of-the-mill corporate transactions, which we see now, could 
evolve into something else, something more like insurance against 
abusive tax positions or overly aggressive interpretations of the tax 
laws. Therefore, the interesting questions are how likely is that 
possibility, what can be done to prevent it, and whether, on balance, 
tax risk insurance ought to be considered a socially beneficial - or at 
least benign - development, or whether it should be discouraged or 
banned altogether. This Article addresses these questions. A related 
question, which will not be the focus of this Article but which the 
analysis of this Article raises, is whether there might be a legitimate 
role for private insurance in other contexts of regulatory legal 
uncertainty. 
Part II begins with a description of the general problem of tax law 
enforcement; the blurry distinction between tax evasion and tax 
avoidance; and the link between those concepts, the rules/standards 
debate, the concept of legal uncertainty, and the market for tax risk 
insurance. Part III then describes what I call the "old markets" in tax 
insurance, which consist of (a) the use of tax indemnity agreements in 
corporate merger and acquisition transactions and (b) the widespread 
and uncontroversial phenomenon of warranties or guarantees issued 
by tax preparation firms to individual and small business taxpayers. 
Part III also briefly discusses what I call tax advisor warranties that 
tum out to have essentially the same structure as contingent fee 
arrangements for tax advice and, in the view of the Treasury 
Department, do raise enforcement concerns. Part IV, the meat of the 
Article, provides a somewhat more detailed description of the new tax 
indemnity insurance market and the factors that seem to give rise to it. 
Part IV also gives fuller voice to the worries that one might have 
concerning a market for tax insurance given the already serious 
deterrence problems in the area of corporate tax enforcement. This 
Part also explains in greater detail the somewhat surprising case in 
favor of allowing or even subsidizing the use of tax insurance in 
certain settings and explores whether there is any significant 
difference between tax indemnity insurance and commercial liability 
insurance such that the former ought to be restricted or banned 
whereas the latter is not only allowed but encouraged. It also outlines 
a possible disclosure solution that tax policymakers might adopt to 
minimize the dangers and maximize the advantages of tax indemnity 
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insurance - that is, to minimize the possibility that it will be used to 
cover only detection risk. Finally, Part IV briefly considers an 
alternative to commercially provided legal uncertainty insurance: 
government provided legal uncertainty insurance - either through 
the increased use of private letter rulings or, more interestingly, the 
introduction of government provided tax liability insurance. Either 
approach has advantages and disadvantages, which I discuss below. 
II. EVASION AND AVOIDANCE, RULES AND STANDARDS, AND THE 
PROBLEM OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
A. An Introductory Note on Tax Noncompliance 
There is a sense in which tax compliance is a permanent problem. 
As with the enforcement of any law that imposes burdens on 
individuals for the collective good, there will always be incentives for 
free riding. What this means in the tax context is that taxpayers, 
individual and corporate, will always have an incentive to minimize 
their own tax liabilities while continuing to take full advantage of the 
benefits of government expenditures.10 A corollary of this fact is that 
in the absence of government imposed penalties for noncompliance, 
our practice of funding government expenditures through tax 
revenues would be highly problematic. At the heart of this 
conventional view is the classical deterrence model of tax law, which 
10 The so-called "tax gap" is the Service's effort to estimate the overall shortfall 
in federal tax dollars due to noncompliance. That is, the tax gap measures the 
difference between how much in federal taxes ought to have been paid for a 
particular tax year and how much was actually paid. The first number has historically 
been calculated using a complicated set of formulas and inputting data from the old 
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), which was carried throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s but which ended in 1995. The latter number is taken from 
estimated and actual tax collections. See generally JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, 
TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER T AXES 174-76 (3d ed. 
2004) (explaining the tax gap calculation). Since 2001, tax gap data have been 
gathered under the new, less ambitious, but less intrusive National Research Program. 
But those data have not yet been analyzed. The tax gap consists of three components: 
underreporting of income (e.g., excessive deductions, underreported income, and the 
like), nonfiling, and underpayment of stated liabilities. It is the underreporting figure 
that constitutes the lion's share of the tax gap and that presents the largest tax 
compliance problem. According to TCMP data from the 1970s and 1980s 
extrapolated to the 2001 tax year, underreporting is estimated to be around 13.8 
percent for individual taxpayers and 17.4 percent for corporations. Joel Slemrod, The 
Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 10858, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10858. 
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says that taxpayers rationally respond to incentives including formal 
tax penalties.11 This is not to say, of course, that informal sanctions 
such as social norms play no role in encouraging tax compliance, nor 
that tax compliance would be nonexistent in the absence of sanctions. 
To the contrary, there is evidence that taxpayers, at least corporate 
and self-employed taxpayers, voluntarily pay more in taxes than 
formal deterrence models would predict.12 In fact, given how many 
individuals and firms do pay their taxes, it seems reasonable to assume 
either that there is some degree of cognitive failure, such as 
overestimation of the likelihood of detection, or perhaps 
altruism/patriotism on the part of taxpayers. Perhaps the informal 
sanctions taxpayers face, such as the reputational costs of being 
labeled a "tax cheat," are a more significant deterrent than one might 
initially think.13 Still, few doubt that the traditional deterrence factors 
11 The seminal statement of this Beckeresque view of tax law is found in Michael 
G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. 
PUB. ECON. 323 (1972). Under the Allingham/Sandmo model, taxpayers seek to 
minimize their tax payment, taking into account only the obvious deterrence variables 
such as the probability of detection, size of the penalty, tax rate, actual income, and 
the like. 
12 This phenomenon has inspired some scholars to assert that U.S. taxpayers are 
"pathologically honest," in the sense that they pay more in taxes than the standard 
deterrence (Allingham/Sandmo) model would suggest. It is almost as if taxpayers are, 
in effect, making a "gift" to the government. Joel Slemrod, Trust in Public Finance 
(Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9187, 2002), available at 
http://www .nber.org/papers/w9187. As Joel Slemrod points out, however, this 
argument is often overstated, insofar as it fails to recognize that, with many individual 
taxpayers, especially those whose primary source of income is in the form of wages, 
the level of compliance is very high, just as the traditional deterrence model would 
predict. This fact seems to be due, in large part, to the role of information returns, 
which the Service can easily cross-reference with tax returns. Id. Still, with respect to 
the corporate income tax, as well as with respect to some forms of individual income, 
such as self-employment income, the well-documented opportunities for undetectable 
evasion are so plentiful that the traditional model, narrowly construed, clearly does 
not provide the full explanation. 
13 See generally WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (containing empirical studies of the role of 
social norms and morality on compliance); James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan 
Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 850 (1998) (discussing literature on 
the effect of morality and social norms on tax compliance). It is also possible that, 
with respect to some taxpayers and some types of tax compliance, formal and 
informal sanctions, or extrinsic and intrinsic sanctions, work not as complements to 
but as substitutes for each other, such that increasing the formal penalties for tax 
noncompliance could actually reduce compliance by "crowding out" intrinsic or moral 
motivations to comply. See Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out 
Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J. 1043 (1997). There is some experimental evidence that 
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- the probability of detection and the magnitude of the formal 
penalty - remain tremendously important in the compliance 
equation for many taxpayers. This seems especially true for most if 
not all sophisticated taxpayers, by which I mean taxpayers -
corporations and wealthy individuals, as well as partnerships and 
trusts through which wealthy individuals often invest - who hire 
expert tax advisors to help them arrange their financial affairs so as to 
minimize their taxes, or more precisely to maximize their after-tax 
returns on various investments.14 
An important question then, given the interrelated effects of 
formal and informal sanctions as well as extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations, is whether the traditional deterrence variables are 
currently set at socially optimal levels. Many tax experts think not. 
As mentioned in the Introduction,15 there is a widely held view among 
tax academics and practitioners that a large and increasing number of 
corporations and wealthy individuals are engaging in highly aggressive 
tax avoidance transactions, often referred to as tax shelters,16 that lack 
any significant economic substance, have no discernible nontax 
business purpose, and, although based on literal interpretations of the 
Code, produce tax outcomes that any reasonable person would agree 
are inconsistent with sound tax principles. Many tax experts view the 
solution to the problem as one of deterrence. That is, many would 
agree that to address the tax shelter problem, we need to increase the 
this crowding out effect is real. See, e.g. , Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a 
Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (showing that when parents at a day-care center 
were required to pay a fine for being late to pick up their children, compliance 
decreased rather than increased). Thus, insofar as the current level of compliance is 
due to intrinsic motivations, increasing the formal penalties for noncompliance may 
be counterproductive. This need not necessarily be the case, of course, both because 
the crowding effect may be small or nonexistent, and in some cases the effect may go 
the other way - that is, increasing formal penalties may increase the effect of social 
sanctions and intrinsic motivations. 
14 Below I draw a distinction between "tax advisors" and "tax return preparers." 
I use the former term to describe tax experts who help taxpayers plan their 
transactions in advance so as to maximize after-tax returns. I use the latter term for 
tax experts who help taxpayers fill out and file their returns. Tax preparers therefore 
are, for the most part, working with transactions that have already taken place. The 
line between advisors and preparers can obviously be blurred; sophisticated taxpayers 
may have the same firm that assisted them in setting up various tax-advantaged 
transactions prepare their returns. But even then, it would likely be a different 
person within the firm. In any event, the distinction holds up in many instances. 
15 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7. 
16 As I have already mentioned, "tax shelter" has no settled meaning, and there 
is much dispute over what qualifies as a shelter and what does not. See supra note 6. 
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probability that shelters will be detected by the Service, by either 
increasing the frequency and thoroughness of audits - which means 
significantly increasing the Service's budget - or increasing disclosure 
requirements. In addition, we need to increase substantially the 
penalties actually imposed for tax underpayments by either increasing 
the size of the penalties on the books or, alternatively, by taking steps 
to insure that the penalties that already exist get imposed in 
appropriate cases.17 Other commentators contend that unless the 
Service and the courts do a better job of defining what constitutes an 
abusive tax shelter, increasing audit rates and penalty assessments will 
have little effect.18 In addition, some tax experts also worry that the 
highly publicized spread of sophisticated tax avoidance on the part of 
corporate and wealthy taxpayers undermines the average taxpayer's 
respect for the system and thus can lead to increased noncompliance 
at every level.19 
B. Introducing Legal Uncertainty and the Tax Compliance Continuum 
I have been speaking of the terms "compliance" and 
"noncompliance" as if they have self-evident meanings. They do not. 
In fact, one of the central problems of tax law enforcement is that 
these terms are not self-defining, but often mean different things to 
17 See, e.g. , Bankman, supra note 7, at 1786-91 (listing such proposals); Study of 
Present-Law Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section 3801 of the 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Including Provisions 
Relating to Corporate Tax Shelters), TAX NOTES TODAY 232 (July 26, 1999) (LEXIS, 
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 1999 TNT 142-72) (same). See generally 
Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REv. 125 (2002) (including 
numerous articles addressing a range of proposals for enhancing traditional 
deterrence variables). 
18 James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New Bottles, 
55 Tax L. Rev. 135, 160 (2002); Michael L. Schier, Ten More Truths About Tax 
Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX 
L. REV. 325, 360-62 (2002); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 
TAX L. REV. 215, 248 (2002). 
19 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 7, at 3: 
Corporate tax shelters breed disrespect for the tax system - both by the 
people who participate in the tax shelter market and by others who 
perceive unfairness. A view that well-advised corporations can and do 
avoid their legal tax liabilities by engaging in these tax-engineered 
transactions may cause a "race to the bottom." If unabated, this will have 
long-term consequences to our voluntary tax system far more important 
than the revenue losses we currently are experiencing in the corporate tax 
base. 
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different people, a fact that has consequences for designing an optimal 
tax-enforcement regime as well as for the issue of tax law uncertainty. 
So what is usually meant by the term "noncompliance?" For starters, 
a distinction is often made between "evasion" and "avoidance," 
although the distinction is, to tax experts, notoriously fuzzy. In simple 
terms, "evasion" means a clear violation of an unambiguous tax rule. 
With tax evasion, then, the taxpayer has no plausible argument that 
her position is consistent with the law. In addition, the concept of tax 
evasion is often understood to include some element of intentionality 
on the part of the taxpayer.20 That is, a tax evader is thought to be 
someone who knowingly breaks the tax laws and who, in fact, takes 
steps to cover up the crime, and thus evade detection.21 On this view, 
a quintessential example of tax evasion would be the intentional 
failure to report items of income. Thus, it is tax evasion when a self­
employed individual knowingly and intentionally does not report 
income that was received during the relevant tax period.22 Likewise, 
when an individual or taxable entity deducts expenses that are clearly 
not deductible according to the Code, or takes deductions for entirely 
fictional expenses, the individual or entity commits tax evasion. In 
20 The American Heritage Dictionary defines tax evasion as the " [i]ntentional 
avoidance of tax payment usually by inaccurately declaring taxable income." THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000), 
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=tax%20evasion. Merriam 
Webster's Dictionary of Law adds the following gloss in its main entry for tax evasion: 
"a willful and esp. criminal attempt to evade the imposition or payment of a tax." 
MERRIAM WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW (1996), available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=tax%20evasion. 
21 Of course, the old "ignorance of the law" adage applies to taxes as well. Thus, 
having a sincere subjective believe that an activity is legal under the tax laws is not an 
excuse for tax evasion. In practice, however, it seems likely that unsophisticated 
taxpayers will be able to avoid a criminal conviction if they can demonstrate good 
faith, albeit mistaken, beliefs in the positions they took or good faith reliance on their 
tax advisors. There are some tax positions, however, that likely will get you criminally 
punished irrespective of your subjective intent. This is because these positions are so 
obviously contrary to established law and have been struck down so many times 
before that claims of good faith reliance are not credible. Examples of this would be 
such standard tax-protestor arguments as the claim that the filing of federal income 
tax returns is "voluntary," understood to mean optional. For a statement and 
refutation of this position, see Internal Revenue Serv., Anti-Tax Law Evasion 
Schemes - Law and Arguments (Section 1), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
businesses/small/article/O,,id=l06502,00.html. 
22 Tax evaders often facilitate such off-the-books transactions by insisting on 
payment in cash only. See Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, the Cash 
Economy, and Compliance Costs, 104 TAX NOTES 185, 188 (July 12, 2004). 
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addition, if a wealthy individual hides income in a foreign bank 
account in a manner that is clearly not allowed by U.S. tax law, that 
taxpayer clearly is a tax evader. A conviction for tax evasion under 
this definition, because it is a criminal offense, can result in the 
perpetrator's not only having to pay back taxes, interest, as well as 
civil and criminal penalties, but also having to spend some time in 
jaii.23 As I discuss more fully in Part IV below, no tax insurance 
policies cover tax evasion defined this way. 
If tax evasion is defined as the clear (and usually intentional) 
violation of the tax laws in order to reduce one's tax liability, what is 
tax avoidance? An obvious possibility suggests itself: Why not define 
tax avoidance as arranging your affairs to minimize your taxes in a 
manner that is consistent with the tax laws? Or as doing everything 
within the law to reduce your tax liability?24 This definition would set 
up a nice dichotomy between tax evasion (illegal) and tax avoidance 
(legal) and would greatly simplify the job of the tax enforcer, not to 
mention the scholar.25 Moreover, just as there are obvious examples 
23 The maximum penalty for noncriminal (nonfraudulent) underpayment of 
taxes is twenty percent of the tax understatement. I.RC. § 6662(a). The penalty for 
civil fraud is seventy-five percent of the understatement. Id. § 6663(a). If a party is 
convicted of criminal tax evasion, under the higher standards of proof found in the 
criminal system, the maximum penalty for an individual is up to $100,000 and five 
years in prison for criminal evasion and $25,000 and/or one year in prison for criminal 
failure to file. Id. §§ 7201, 7203. 
24 See, e.g. , DAVID L. Scarr, WALL STREET WORDS: AN ESSENTIAL A TO z 
GUIDE FOR TODAY'S INVESTOR 379 (1997) (stating definition of tax avoidance as 
" [t]he reduction of a tax liability by legal means. For example, high-income 
individuals avoid significant federal income taxes by purchasing and holding 
municipal bonds."). 
25 This neat dichotomy is often restated in various dictionaries and 
encyclopedias. See, e.g. , Tax Avoidance/Evasion, available at http:!/ en. wikipedia.orgl 
wiki/Tax_evasion (last visited Oct. 4, 2005): 
Tax avoidance is the legal exploitation of the tax regime to one's own 
advantage, to attempt to reduce the amount of tax that is payable by means 
that are within the law whilst making a full disclosure of the material 
information to the tax authorities. Examples of tax avoidance involve using 
tax deductions, changing one's tax status through incorporation or 
establishing an offshore company in a tax haven. 
By contrast tax evasion is the general term for efforts by individuals, firms, 
trusts and other entities to evade the payment of taxes by illegal means. 
Tax evasion usually entails taxpayers deliberately misrepresenting or 
concealing the true state of their affairs to the tax authorities to reduce 
their tax liability, and includes, in particular, dishonest tax reporting (such 
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of tax evasion, there are obvious examples of legal tax avoidance as 
well. For instance, it is clearly legal avoidance when a taxpayer takes 
advantage of a so-called tax-expenditure prov1s1on in a 
straightforward way. Tax expenditures are Code provisions intended 
by Congress to provide subsidies for certain types of activities or 
transactions.26 Thus, whether it is investing in tax-exempt bonds or 
investing in property subject to accelerated depreciation, the term 
"legal avoidance" would fit. Even if you are offended by tax 
expenditures as a policy matter, when a taxpayer takes advantage of 
them, even if the transaction is primarily tax motivated, the behavior 
is clearly legal. Clearly legal avoidance, however, is not limited to tax 
expenditures. It might also include some - though, as I will point out 
below, not all - investments that exploit the tax advantages inherent 
in the structure of the tax laws. An example of this would be a simple 
purchase of growth stock in order to get the benefit of the realization 
doctrine, as well as the preferential capital gains rate.27 Moreover, to 
use the economist's capacious understanding of the term, "tax 
avoidance" would include an individual's decision to reduce work 
hours in response to the existence of the income tax or an increase in 
tax rates, another example of obviously legal behavior. In any event, 
what unifies all of these examples is that whether or not one considers 
the tax provision in question to be good or bad tax policy, and there is 
much debate on that question, there can be no doubt that many of the 
as underdeclaring income, profits or gains; or overstating deductions). 
Tax avoidance may be considered as either the amoral dodging of one's 
duties to society, part of a strategy of not supporting violent government 
activities or just the right of every citizen to find all the legal ways to avoid 
paying too much tax. Tax evasion, on the other hand, is a crime in almost 
all countries and subjects the guilty party to fines or even imprisonment. 
Switzerland is one notable exception: tax fraud (forging documents, for 
example) is considered a crime, tax evasion (like underdeclaring assets) is 
not. 
(emphasis omitted). 
26 This is not to say, of course, that illegal tax avoidance cannot involve tax 
expenditure provisions. Combining a tax expenditure provision with some structural 
aspect of the Code to create arbitrage opportunities has been a common way of 
achieving questionably legal avoidance. My only point here is that there are some 
easy cases of legal avoidance, such as the straightforward use of tax expenditure 
provisions. 
27 Abusive tax shelters can also involve exploitation of certain structural 
elements in the Code, such as the realization doctrine or the distinction between debt 
and equity. The point here is that some of the tax savings due to the structure of the 
Code are clearly legal, in the sense that they were intended by Congress. 
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transactions that exploit these provisions were intended by Congress 
and are undoubtedly legal. 
Unfortunately, the neat dichotomy between illegal evasion and 
legal avoidance does not encompass all the interesting possibilities. 
That we can identify clear examples of illegal evasion and legal 
avoidance does not mean that all of the tax law is clear-cut. To the 
contrary, as every tax practitioner and tax commentator knows - and 
as many law students in the introductory federal income tax course 
struggle to understand - there are many situations in which the tax 
law is unclear and thus distinguishing between what is legal and 
illegal, what is permissible and impermissible, can be extremely 
difficult. To put the point more precisely, with respect to many 
provisions in the tax code, taxpayers face significant uncertainty ex 
ante as to how those provisions will be applied by the Service and by 
the courts to particular situations that taxpayers confront. Given this 
uncertainty, a taxpayer who wishes to comply with the tax laws, either 
because of moral compunction or because of a desire to avoid formal 
or informal sanctions, but who does not wish to donate money to the 
federal government - that is, does not want to pay more than the law 
in fact requires - faces the difficulty of making choices based on 
rough probability estimates as to what the law "is" at any given time. 
And what this means conceptually and, in terms of determining 
whether or not the taxpayer will be assessed penalties, what it means 
in practice, is that the taxpayer must make an educated guess as to 
what some ex post adjudicator will determine the law "is," or, more 
precisely, what the law was when the taxpayer engaged in the 
transaction or activity in question. 
Thinking of tax compliance, and legal compliance more generally, 
in these probabilistic terms is on one level obviously unrealistic. We 
are accustomed to viewing taxpayers, at least sophisticated taxpayers, 
as rational - even hyper-rational - actors. Indeed, it is well known 
that some taxpayers are motivated to take especially aggressive, even 
illegal, positions on their tax returns precisely because they have 
rationally calculated their probability of detection as being very low. 
But it is quite a different matter to imagine the average individual 
taxpayer doing a probabilistic calculation not to determine whether to 
comply with a clear legal rule, but to decipher what the tax law is in 
the first place. And yet, at least for sophisticated taxpayers with 
expert legal advisors to help them minimize their tax payments while 
avoiding penalties, such probabilistic estimates are a part of the 
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process.28 Indeed, the tax laws and regulations make the application 
of tax penalties for noncompliance depend on such probabilistic 
assessments. That is, if the Service and the courts determine ex post 
that a particular position taken by a taxpayer is wrong - that the 
taxpayer underpaid its taxes - then whether the taxpayer must pay 
penalties as well will depend on the Service's and ultimately a court's 
ex post assessment of the taxpayer's ex ante probability of success on 
the merits. For example, the twenty percent "substantial 
understatement" penalty, which is assessed to taxpayers found to have 
understated their tax liability by the lesser of $5000 ($10,000 for 
corporations) or ten percent of the overall liability, can be avoided if it 
can be shown that with respect to the tax issue in question the 
taxpayer had "substantial authority."29 Substantial authority has been 
interpreted by the Service to mean something less than a fifty percent 
chance of prevailing on the merits of the issue, assuming the issue is 
detected on audit.30 With respect to tax shelters, the probability of 
prevailing on the merits must be greater to avoid penalties, which 
makes sense given that shelters are a class of transactions that by 
definition have relatively weak support in the law.31 Specifically, if the 
28 I do not mean to suggest that there is a large class of taxpayers who are 
constantly doing probability calculations to determine what the law is with regard to 
every tax provision. However, with respect to the tax law provisions (a) that are 
uncertain in application and (b) that can have a significant effect on tax liabilities, 
many sophisticated taxpayers in fact do such probabilistic calculations - assessing 
what the Service and a court will likely say the law is - explicitly or implicitly. Of 
course, they also take into account the probability of detection and the likelihood of 
penalties, among other factors. Also, it seems obvious that, in contrast to 
sophisticated taxpayers, average individual taxpayers, almost by definition, spend far 
less time and resources thinking about such things, if they consider them at all. Even 
for those taxpayers, however, insofar as they use paid tax preparers who are tax law 
experts, the result can wind up being the same: decisions based on probabilistic 
estimates of how an ex post adjudicator will assess the merits of a claim. 
29 Alternatively, the substantial understatement penalty can be avoided if the 
taxpayer can show that (a) the tax position at issue was disclosed to the Service, and 
(b) the position had a "reasonable basis" in the law. I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(B). 
30 Treas. Reg. § l .6662-4(d)(2) (2003). How much less stringent is the 
substantial authority standard than the more-likely-than-not standard? That is not 
clear, though it is apparently more stringent than the reasonable basis standard. 
Reasonable basis, in tum, is a higher standard than "not frivolous" or "not patently 
improper." Id. § l .6662-3(b)(3). 
31 The Code defines tax shelters as "(I) a partnership or other entity, (II) any 
investment plan or arrangement, or (III) any other plan or arrangement, if a 
significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance 
or evasion of Federal income tax." I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii). This definition is 
obviously less pejorative than my loose operational definition, which includes an 
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taxpayer can prove to the Service or a court that the position in 
question was ex ante "more likely than not" to succeed on the merits 
if it were detected, then the taxpayer can avoid the penalties for tax 
understatements with respect to positions that meet the Code's 
definition of a tax shelter.32 If all these probabilistic standards were 
assumption that position in question would like not survive judicial scrutiny. See 
supra note 6. 
32 I.RC. § 6662(d)(2). The penalty is higher in certain situations. For example, 
if a taxpayer engages in a reportable transaction, which is an even more narrowly 
defined set of shelter-type transactions (described in section 6011) but fails to satisfy 
special tax shelter reporting requirements, the understatement penalty rises to thirty 
percent. I.RC. § 6662A(c). Also, the understatement penalty is forty percent rather 
than twenty percent for "gross valuation misstatements." Id. § 6662(h)(l). Finally, a 
seventy-five percent penalty can be imposed for fraudulent understatements, 
although this penalty is rarely handed out. Id. § 6663. The penalty rules for tax 
shelters have recently changed as a result of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-357, 1 18 Stat. 1418. Prior to that Act, a distinction was drawn 
between corporate and noncorporate taxpayers engaged in shelter transactions. For 
noncorporate taxpayers, the normal substantial understatement penalty for tax 
shelters could be avoided only if (a) there is substantial authority for the position, and 
(b) the taxpayer reasonably believed that there was a greater than fifty percent 
chance of prevailing on the merits. I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (amended 2004). And for 
purposes of former Code section 6662(d)(2)(C), and thus for tax years ending before 
October 22, 2004, this reasonable belief could be established based on a good faith 
reliance on a tax advisor's more-likely-than-not opinion, assuming the advice was 
based on all the relevant facts and the advisor was qualified. Treas. Reg. § l.6662-
4(g)( 4)(ii) (2003). This reduction in the substantial understatement penalty, again, 
was not available to corporate taxpayers. The 2004 Act eliminated this option for 
noncorporate taxpayers. See I.RC. § 6662(d)(2)(C). However, the understatement 
penalties generally can be abated, for corporate and noncorporate taxpayers, if a 
taxpayer can demonstrate that it acted with "reasonable cause" and in "good faith" in 
reporting the position in question. Id. § 6664(c). The relevant regulations provide 
that reasonable cause exists where the taxpayer "reasonably relies in good faith on 
the opinion of a professional tax advisor . . .  [who] unambiguously concludes [on the 
basis of the pertinent facts and authorities] that there is a greater than 50-percent 
likelihood that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by the" 
Service. Treas. Reg. §§ l .6662-4(g)(4)(i)(B), l .6664-4(c) (2003). The 2004 Act, 
however, changed the reasonable cause abatement provision as well by implementing, 
in effect, a strict liability standard for understatements attributable to so-called 
"listed" or "reportable transactions," which, as defined under Code section 6011 ,  are 
transactions that the Service has identified as special categories of tax shelters or 
potential tax shelters. I.RC. § 6664(c). If a transaction falls under these new rules, 
which also apply to tax years ending after October 22, 2004, there is a stricter set of 
reasonable cause and good faith standards that must be satisfied to avoid the penalty. 
Even these stricter standards, however, require the taxpayer to show, among other 
things, that it reasonably believed that the position in question had a better-than-fifty­
percent chance of prevailing on the merits if detected. Thus, quantifiable merits risk 
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not enough, there is also the "realistic possibility of success" standard, 
which governs certain tax preparer penalties and is quantified as at 
least a 33 percent chance of winning on the merits, again, assuming 
detection.33 
In sum, the penalty provisions in the Code force taxpayers to 
think about tax law in probabilistic terms. At least with respect to 
Code provisions whose application is uncertain, or uncertain in some 
contexts, taxpayers who want to avoid penalties must assess the 
chances that a particular interpretation will be upheld or rejected. 
One way of thinking of the choice confronted by the taxpayer under 
these conditions of substantive legal uncertainty is to imagine any 
given interpretation of the tax laws falling somewhere on a 
continuum. What the continuum measures is the ex ante probability 
that a court will decide that the particular tax law interpretation the 
taxpayer has chosen or is relying upon is the correct one, assuming the 
position is detected and evaluated by a court - that is, assuming 
detection risk to be 100 percent. If the interpretation were to fall on 
one end of the continuum, that position would be considered outright 
tax evasion, since it would have a zero probability of being sustained 
on the merits if examined by a court. If the interpretation were to fall 
on the other end of the spectrum, it would be considered 
unambiguously legal, which means here that the probability that the 
position would be upheld on the merits by a court if examined is 100 
percent. Moreover, we can conceive of movement along the 
continuum as representing a change in the probability that a court will 
accept the taxpayer's position on the merits.34 For all practical 
is still an essential test. In addition to satisfying this more-likely-than-not test, there 
must be for reportable and listed transactions, (a) adequate disclosure of relevant 
facts (as required under section 6011), and (b) substantial authority. Also, in 
determining whether there was reasonable belief in a better than fifty-percent chance 
of winning, the taxpayer may have relied on expert advice, but must not have relied 
on certain types of "disqualified opinions" or "disqualified tax advisors," the latter of 
which includes tax shelter promoters. Id. 
33 Treas. Reg. § l .6694-2(c) (1992). 
34 Thinking of the tax-compliance question in terms of a continuum is not new. 
Daniel Shaviro, for example, has pointed out the continuous nature of these 
distinctions: 
Aggressive paper shuffling to minimize tax liability is not identical to 
cheating if its being impermissible under the existing state of the law is not 
clear-cut. But there is an issue of degree here, and a slippery slope. Taking 
self-interested but reasonable reporting positions slides over into taking 
positions that are more and more unlikely to be sustained and, therefore, 
deliberately kept secret, converting the entire enterprise into one of playing 
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purposes, at least for sophisticated taxpayers engaged in tax planning, 
the most important part of the continuum lies somewhere in the 
middle.35 
All of this can be illustrated in a simple schematic. 
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the "audit lottery" rather than taking a position that one believes is actually 
reasonable under the law. At a certain point, although it is hard to say 
exactly where, aggressive planning merges into outright cheating. Even 
before that point is reached, the former starts to have many of the same bad 
effects on general compliance as the latter. 
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: WHY 
THEY ARE A PROBLEM AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 25 (2004). 
35 According to some corporate tax practitioners, tax planning is when a 
taxpayer wants to engage in a transaction primarily for nontax business reasons, but 
wishes to structure the transaction so as to minimize its tax liability consistent with the 
tax laws - or consistent with how Congress intended the tax laws to be applied. 
Thus, most practitioners, and some academics, would recognize tax planning as a type 
of legal and legitimate tax avoidance. See, e.g. , Schier, Ten More Truths, supra note 
18, at 384 ("Tax planning is not all bad."). Others, however, regard most tax planning 
activity as being questionably legal, under a sound conception of economic 
performance, and consider most, if not all, tax planning as socially undesirable. See, 
e.g. , Weisbach, Ten Truths, supra note 18, at 222 ("There is no social benefit to tax 
planning."). 
-
� 
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On the left side of the continuum, the merits risk i.e. , the 
chance of losing on the merits if detected - at some point reaches 100 
percent; or, conversely, the probability of winning on the merits 
reaches zero. This point is represented in Figure 1 by Point A. Thus, 
all tax positions or interpretations of the Code to the left of A are 
clearly illegal and constitute tax evasion. By contrast, on the right end 
of the continuum lies a point beyond which the merits risk is zero, and 
hence the chance of winning on the merits is 100 percent. B marks 
that point: the beginning of the domain of clearly legal avoidance. 
Although there can be interesting questions around Points A and B, 
and determining on which side of those points a particular tax position 
will fall can be difficult,36 the most interesting questions in tax 
enforcement, at least for most sophisticated taxpayers, lie in the 
middle part of the continuum between points A and B. This is true 
for several reasons. First, virtually all sophisticated taxpayers want to 
avoid even the appearance of outright evasion since the consequences 
in terms of formal and informal penalties would be catastrophic. 
Thus, they will keep their interpretations comfortably to the right of 
Point A. At the same time, many sophisticated taxpayers will be 
induced to push their interpretations of the Code to the left of Point B 
to ensure that they pay no more in taxes then they actually owe. 
This conclusion suggests that where the action is on the 
continuum is the region clustering around the midpoint between A 
and B. Where this region begins and ends is impossible to say. It is 
also impossible to say with any certainty whether this region is, in the 
real world, centered on something like Point C in a natural bell curve 
formation of sorts, or whether instead it would be skewed to one side 
or the other. The answer to those questions would depend on the 
balancing of a number of forces including the competitive market 
pressures to minimize taxes paid; the role of more-likely-than-not 
opinions tax shelter opinions as an effective form of penalty insurance; 
the probability of detection; and the size of the formal and informal 
penalties. For example, some commentators contend that corporate 
managers desperately want to avoid getting hit with tax penalties, 
which could be a career ending event for them.37 This fact could push 
36 Obviously there are also disputes about whether a particular tax position 
constitutes criminal evasion or whether it falls just on the noncriminal side of the line. 
Indeed, both points (A and B) have their own problems of "fuzziness," but those 
areas are not as interesting, or as problematic, as the large grey area in the middle 
region. 
37 See Bankman, supra note 7, at 1792 ("In the past, at least, imposition of a 20 
percent penalty was seen as a career-ending event for the responsible official in a 
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taxpayers towards interpretations or transaction to the right of C. 
Pushing in the other direction, however, is the very low probability of 
detection and the very low penalties for getting the law wrong as well 
as the existence of tax penalty insurance that is provided by tax 
advisors in the form of more-likely-than-not shelter opinions. These 
are legal opinions provided by tax advisors that analyze the tax 
position being considered and almost inevitably conclude that the 
position is more likely than not to be sustained on the merits if 
detected on audit and ultimately evaluated by a court. In other words, 
these opinions in effect conclude that the reporting position falls to 
the right of Point C. It is generally believed that having a more-likely­
than-not opinion effectively eliminates the risk of a substantial 
understatement penalty for a tax shelter position as courts tend to be 
deferential to such opinions when it comes to assessing penalties.38 
Again, anecdotal evidence and conventional wisdom among tax 
experts suggest that something of the sort is in fact happening; hence 
the recent hubbub about tax shelter activity and the role of tax shelter 
• • 39 opm10ns. 
We shall return to the idea of the tax compliance continuum and 
the problem of aggressive avoidance below. For now, the important 
idea to take from this discussion is the general one: that the tax law 
can be characterized by significant substantive uncertainty and thus 
can be viewed probabilistically from an ex ante perspective. What will 
become clear below is that this fact can have serious consequences in 
terms of overall social welfare. 
company's tax department. In many companies, this may be true today."). 
38 Id. at 1 779 ("In theory, such opinions ought not to serve as protection from 
the substantial understatement penalty. In practice, any run-of-the-mill opinion letter 
is thought to insulate the taxpayer from the substantial understatement 
penalty . . . .  "). 
39 Indeed, this concern about the increase in tax shelter activity and the role of 
more-likely-than-not opinions led to the recently finalized revisions to Circular 230, 
which were designed to increase the standards of practitioners issuing tax opinions on 
transactions whose principle (or even significant) purpose is tax evasion or avoidance. 
Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg. 
75,839 (Dec. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.33, 10.35 to .38, 10.52, and 
10.93). For a discussion of the new tax opinion standards in Circular 230, see Arthur 
L. Baily & Alexis Macivor, New Circular 230 Regulations Impose Strict Standards for 
Tax Practitioners, 107 TAX NOTES 341 (Apr. 18, 2005). 
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C. Sources of Legal Uncertainty: Rules and Standards in Tax Law 
Before we address the consequences of tax law uncertainty, there 
is more to be said about the sources. That there can be significant 
substantive legal uncertainty in the tax laws may come as a surprise to 
nonexperts in the field. After all, the tax system is the quintessential 
rule-based, as opposed to a standards-based, legal regime. Almost by 
definition there is supposed to be less substantive legal uncertainty 
with a system of rules than with a system of standards. Although the 
tax system is primarily a system of rules, it is inevitably a system of 
standards as well, as some scholars have recently begun to 
emphasize.40 This is because, even in a system with highly complex 
rules - in fact, perhaps especially in such a system - there can be 
difficult questions of how the rules are to be applied to complex 
transactions. 
The rules/standards distinction in law is well known. With a rule, 
the relevant lawmaker (whether it be Congress or some agency acting 
as rule-promulgator) determines ex ante - that is, before the conduct 
being regulated takes place - relatively precisely what conduct is 
permitted or compelled under what particular circumstances. With a 
standard, by contrast, the ex ante lawmaker provides relatively few 
details regarding the regulated conduct, leaving more of the content of 
the command to be provided ex post. Thus, with rules, the ex ante 
lawmakers, be they part of a legislature or agency, must provide most 
of the normative content of the rule; while ex post adjudicators, be 
they judges, jurors, or agency officials, are responsible primarily only 
for applying law to facts. With standards, the job of the ex ante 
lawmaker is somewhat easier, but the ex post adjudicator must both 
provide content to the law and apply the law to the facts at hand.41 
The classic illustration of the rules/standards distinction involves 
traffic safety laws.42 A traffic safety rule might be that drivers may not 
40 DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: 
WHY THEY ARE A PROBLEM AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 4-6 (2004); David A. 
Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Tax Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 88, 89-92 (2002). 
41 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557 (1992). 
42 Id. at 560. For a summary of how the rules/standards distinction has been 
applied in the tax context specifically, see SHAVIRO, supra note 34, at 4-6, and David 
A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860 (1999). Of course, 
there can be both standards and rules governing the same activity, and that often is 
the case for activities - such as operating an automobile - that present special 
regulatory concerns. 
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exceed fifty-five miles per hour on the highway. The only issue for the 
ex post adjudicator then is whether a particular driver exceeded the 
speed lim.it.43 A traffic safety standard, by contrast, might require that 
drivers always drive reasonably under the circumstances, leaving the 
ex post adjudicator to determine not only the speed at which the 
driver was traveling but also whether that speed was reasonable. 
Common sense would suggest that for the driver trying to decide how 
to drive consistently with the laws, the relatively vague standard 
would present significantly greater legal uncertainty than would the 
relatively clear speed limit rule. Indeed, some have even suggested 
that the differing degrees of legal uncertainty provide one essential 
way of distinguishing rules from standards.44 
What does all this have to do with taxes? Is the federal income 
tax system the quintessential system of rules, or is it not?45 It is 
certainly true that the federal tax system has one of the most complex 
and comprehensive set of rules of any area of American law. Even 
though a good case can probably be made for simplifying the existing 
tax code, as most tax experts recommend,46 such simplification would 
not eliminate the need for many detailed and complex rules. In other 
words, it almost certainly makes sense that the tax system should have 
a lot of detailed rules, even if not as many rules as we currently have.47 
43 Obviously a rule of this sort could be more complex than this, providing 
different speed limits for different situations. 
44 Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 502, 513 (Boudewijn 
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) ("Indeed, if rules are defined as the extent 
to which legal commands are given content ex ante and thus the ease with which 
private parties can predict how the law will apply to their conduct, legal uncertainty 
might be viewed as simply a measure of the extent to which a legal command is 
standard-like."). As I argue below, see infra text accompanying notes 59-60, however, 
uncertainty can arise precisely because of the complexity of rules and hence the 
difficulty of determining how such complex rules will be applied in specific settings. 
45 Weisbach, supra note 42, at 860 ("The tax law is the paradigmatic system of 
rules."). Weisbach then goes on to explain why lawmakers have begun to introduce 
standards into the tax law's predominantly rule-based approach. Id. 
46 William G. Gale, Tax Simplification: Issues and Options, Testimony before 
House Ways and Means Committee, July 17, 2001 ("The notion that taxes should be 
simpler is one of the very few propositions in tax policy that generates universal 
agreement.") , available at http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/gale/ 
20010717.pdf. 
47 Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 
VA. TAX REV. 1 ,  56 (2004) ("The Code (including subchapter K) has been, and 
undoubtedly will continue to be, primarily a rule-based statute. It is important that 
the 'millions of taxpayers who engage in billions of transactions' be able to file annual 
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Why is this so? According to the orthodox legal theory of rules and 
standards, relatively detailed rules are generally preferable when the 
cost of determining ex ante what the permissible or required conduct 
should be for a given situation is low relative to an ex post 
determination, and when the frequency of application of the rule is 
likely to be high.48 By contrast, standards are to be preferred when an 
ex ante determination of the optimal conduct is relatively costly and 
when the norm in question will be applied by the ex post adjudicator 
relatively infrequently.49 This is why it could make sense in a tort 
system to have a general, somewhat vague reasonableness standard 
regulating the conduct of, say, drivers,50 but it is difficult even to 
conceive of a tax system composed entirely of standards to be 
adjudicated ex post. Consider the silliness, for example, of a 
hypothetical tax system that had no detailed rules but merely required 
all taxpayers to remit to the government each year a reasonable 
amount under the circumstances. The current compliance problems 
would pale by comparison to those inherent in such a system. In sum, 
any comprehensive tax regime will need to have detailed and complex 
rules.51 
However, just as the tax system cannot rely solely on standards, 
neither can it rely exclusively on rules. Thus, as with presumably 
every area of law, the tax system is a mixed one; and although rules 
predominate in the U.S. tax system, the use of standards is growing. 
The reasons for this trend are simple. First, a pure rule-based 
approach simply is not feasible; neither Congress nor the Treasury 
tax returns with some degree of certainty without incurring huge compliance costs.") 
(quoting Kaplow, supra note 41, at 573); Weisbach, supra note 42, at 866 ("[G)iven 
the vast number of transactions governed by the tax law, there would be virtually no 
case for which the ex ante promulgation costs would exceed the ex post application 
costs; therefore the tax law should be promulgated almost entirely through rules."). 
48 Kaplow, supra note 41, at 562. 
49 Id. 
50 It also makes sense to have some traffic rules, given that it is fairly easy to 
determine that driving over the speed limit (or, even more obviously, driving on the 
wrong side of the road) is almost always a bad idea. 
51 That is, we should expect the tax system to be relatively more rules-based 
than, say, the general tort system. This is not to deny, of course, that a plausible tax 
regime might rely substantially less on detailed rules than the U.S. system does. It 
should also be noted that even a legal regime that seems to be primarily standards­
based can develop into a more rules-based regime over time as, for example, when 
court decisions interpreting and applying the standard to various factual situations 
begin to accumulate. See Kaplow, supra note 41, at 577-78 (discussing way in which 
precedential value of ex post decisions by courts and other adjudicators can make 
standards more rule-like). 
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Department can possibly anticipate all of the conceivable transactions 
that will be affected by the tax laws, nor would they want to. The 
Code is too long as it is, and, in any event, there comes a point at 
which the cost of ex ante rule-making, including that of the added 
complexity to the system, becomes prohibitive. Second, and more 
important, whatever tax rules are adopted, no matter how specific or 
detailed or comprehensive they are, sophisticated taxpayers with 
fancy tax lawyers and accountants will always find opportunities for 
aggressive or abusive tax avoidance. Put differently, it simply is not 
possible to write tax laws that are devoid of all unintended loopholes. 
These loopholes in turn are exploited by smart tax advisors seeking 
zealously to represent their corporate, and increasingly their wealthy 
individual, clients. Thus, competition induces tax advisors to compete 
to provide the most aggressive, tax-minimizing interpretations of the 
tax laws possible, constrained only by the threat of taxpayer penalties, 
which, given the more likely than not opinions discussed above, is 
often empty.52 As a result, what was a potentially small loophole with 
relevance to only a few transactions, and thus not worth worrying 
about, becomes a large loophole as enterprising tax advisors funnel 
money and clients through such gaps.53 The problem with such 
opportunistic and aggressive exploitation of unintended loopholes (or 
discontinuities) in the tax system, of course, is that they produce both 
distributive unfairness in the short run, as not all taxpayers are equally 
able to avail themselves of these techniques, and inefficiency in the 
long run, as taxpayers shift into the fields that have the most, or are 
best able to exploit, tax loopholes, pushing down the pre-tax rate of 
return in those fields but artificially increasing the number of investors 
or participants in those fields. The point here is that, under a pure 
rule-based approach to generating tax law (that is, assuming there 
were no background anti-avoidance standards to deter abusive 
avoidance - no economic substance, business purpose, or sham 
transaction doctrines) , and if neither Congress nor the Treasury 
Department did anything to stop it, the harm to the tax system would 
52 See supra text accompanying notes 28-35. 
53 As David Weisbach puts this point, the problem with a rules-based tax system 
generally is that the uncommon transaction - the one that it is, by definition, not cost 
effective to handle with an ex ante rule - can become a common transaction, as 
clever tax advisors identify such loopholes and then market them to high-income 
individuals and corporations. Weisbach, supra note 42, at 868-70. As Weisbach 
points out, this inherent vulnerability of rule-based systems may exist in other areas of 
law as well, but seems to be especially problematic in the tax area, for a number of 
reasons, including a pervasive culture of tax law manipulation. Id. at 870-71. 
2005] Tax Law Uncertainty and Tax Insurance 367 
be catastrophic. Under these assumptions, there would be no 
mechanism for closing loopholes. The tax system would either 
collapse or become something very different from what it now is, as 
only the unsophisticated or altruistic would pay any income taxes at 
all. 
Of course, neither Congress nor the Treasury would let the tax 
system collapse. The question is how Congress and the Treasury 
should respond to such inevitable gaps in the law. Consider the pure 
rule-based approach, which would work something like this: When a 
new loophole is discovered, a new rule would have to be adopted to 
close it, either by Congress or by the Treasury acting as rule 
promulgator. These new loophole-closing rules would likely be made 
prospective in application. At least that is how things have worked 
historically. What "prospectivity" means here is that the new rules 
would apply for the most part only to future tax years.54 These new 
loophole-closing rules would then be followed by another round of tax 
shelter "innovation" on the part of tax advisors, who would either 
finds gaps in the new rules or elsewhere in the tax laws. Congress or 
the Treasury would eventually respond with another round of 
prospective loophole-closing legislation or rulemaking, and the cycle 
would continue. The result of such a purely rule-based approach, as 
University of Chicago Law Professor David Weisbach has noted, 
would be an enormous and costly increase in the complexity of the tax 
laws.55 Contrast this scenario with a mixed tax system of mostly rules, 
54 This sort of nominally prospective rule change can of course have retroactive 
effects, insofar as taxpayers made investments in reliance on the previous rules and 
expected to benefit from the old rule for a number of future tax years. See generally 
Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax 
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 49-50 (1977) (defining "nominal prospectivity" and 
"nominal retroactivity"). In some cases, taxpayers in these circumstances are able to 
get even greater transition relief by way of a grandfather rule of some sort. 
55 Weisbach, supra note 42, at 861. Note that if a rule-based response to tax 
loopholes were made nominally retroactive, which they almost never are, it would be 
comparable to a standard-based response to aggressive tax avoidance, since ex post 
anti-avoidance determinations by courts are always applied retroactively. The only 
difference is that with a retroactive rule-based approach, the ex post decision is made 
by Congress or the Treasury Department in their rulemaking capacities. Under such 
a retroactive rule-based approach, it is not entirely clear that there would be an 
increase in complexity as compared with a standard-based approach that relies 
principally on courts as ex post adjudicators. Either way, taxpayers would be deterred 
from looking for loopholes in the first place if they knew they would eventually be 
shut down retroactively. This sort of retroactive repeal, however, is very difficult to 
accomplish as a political matter. Moreover, at least as far as Congress is concerned, 
there may be public choice reasons why such loophole-closing legislation would be 
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but with a background anti-avoidance standard. Under such a mixed 
system, which is not terribly different from what we have today, the 
anti-avoidance standard provides deterrence relatively cheaply by 
closing loopholes retroactively; but it does so without producing 
nearly as much overall complexity as does the prospective rule-based 
approach.56 Again, this is because an anti-avoidance standard need 
not specify in advance every conceivable example of abusive 
avoidance - every unintended tax loophole - that will be struck 
down. It need only state that transactions that fail to satisfy the 
standard, whether economic substance, business purpose, or 
something else, will be disallowed, in which case the taxpayer will owe 
back taxes plus interest and, if the interpretation of the Code was too 
aggressive, penalties as well. It is the tax law equivalent of the 
negligence doctrine in torts. Professor Daniel Shaviro of NYU Law 
School describes benefits of anti-avoidance standards in tax as follows: 
One key reason for using a standard is that the IRS and the 
courts can apply it across the board, without raising issues of 
undue retroactivity, even if the government failed to 
anticipate a particular trick and state in advance that it does 
not work. There are simply too many fault lines in the 
existing income tax and too many clever people laboring 
behind closed doors to find new ways to exploit these fault 
lines for after-the-fact prospective responses to be adequate.57 
D. The Consequences of Legal Uncertainty 
It is conventional wisdom that with the use of legal standards 
comes a degree of substantive legal uncertainty. In fact, Harvard Law 
School Professor Louis Kaplow has put the relationship between 
slow in coming, thus making reliance solely on a rule-based response aggressive 
avoidance impractical. 
56 See Weisbach, supra note 42, at 861; cf Kaplow, supra note 41 , at 593-96 
(challenging the assumption that standards tend to be more complex than rules). This 
view seems correct as far as it goes. When we introduce the possibility of uncertainty 
and the purchase of liability insurance for the consequences of uncertain legal 
standards, however, the use of a standard-based approach to tax law or any other area 
of law, if accompanied by the purchase of liability insurance, would not necessarily 
reduce overall complexity, though it might. The question is whether insurers in 
underwriting their policies would simply replace the complexity of detailed tax rules 
with the complexity of detailed insurance policies. The point is that the comparative 
complexity of the two approaches is not entirely clear. 
57 SHA VIRO, supra note 34, at 23. 
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standards and uncertainty this way: 
[I]f rules are defined as the extent to which legal commands 
are given content ex ante and thus the ease with which private 
parties can predict how the law will apply to their conduct, 
legal uncertainty might be viewed as simply a measure of the 
extent to which a legal command is standard-like.58 
369 
Thus, on this view, when a standard is used in lieu of a system of 
rules, there is a tradeoff between the benefits of reduced complexity 
and the costs of increased uncertainty. To see this point, go back to 
the traffic-safety example, where the roads are governed by a general 
negligence standard requiring reasonable driving. In that example, 
when I am deciding how carefully to drive my car or whether to drive 
at all, I face the possibility that in the event of an accident my driving 
will be deemed to have been unreasonable under the circumstances, 
thus making me liable for the accident costs. The threat of such ex 
post liability can give me an incentive to drive carefully; that incentive 
is the deterrence value of a tort standard. But that threat also creates 
legal uncertainty for me. Indeed, the possibility that my driving will 
be considered by a court ex post to have been unreasonable, and the 
cause of someone else's harm, is just the sort of legal uncertainty that 
can motivate me to purchase auto liability insurance. A similar story 
can be told for any situation in which a liability standard is used; and 
thus a similar story can be told with respect to the use of anti­
avoidance standards in the tax field. Because an anti-avoidance 
standard necessarily leaves open the precise definition of what 
constitutes impermissible tax avoidance, taxpayers engaged in tax 
planning must face a degree of legal uncertainty, uncertainty as to 
what the law is and how it will be applied to a given factual situation. 
It must also be said, however, that a system that consists almost 
entirely of complex rules also can produce a type of legal uncertainty. 
This fact, which typically gets overlooked in discussions of rules and 
standards, becomes evident when one considers the plight of the 
average individual taxpayer attempting to fill out his tax return. The 
Code is so detailed and complex and just plain long that most 
individual taxpayers who attempt to do their own returns can have 
little certainty on April 15 that they have fully complied with the law. 
Indeed, this is why so many individual taxpayers now use tax return 
preparers or tax preparation software, both of which serve as a sort of 
insurance against the uncertainties of the tax laws. Indeed, as 
58 Kaplow, supra note 44, at 513. 
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discussed below, tax return preparers and tax software companies 
often provide warranties with their services, which literally serve as 
insurance for taxpayers against the risk that the return preparer will 
make a mistake on some detail of the law.59 Finally, in addition to the 
uncertainties regarding what the appropriate application of the legal 
rule or standard is, there is also the uncertainty associated with the 
possibility of erroneous decisions on the part of the law enforcers. 
That is, the Service and the court may mistakenly determine that the 
taxpayer has violated the law. That possibility is an element of 
substantive legal uncertainty that taxpayers must also take into 
account.60 
So what is the big deal with a little uncertainty? The world is full 
of uncertainties, and yet life seems to go on. Get over it. Most of us 
are not generally paralyzed by the existence of the uncertainty around 
us. True enough. That does not mean, however, that uncertainty is 
per se good. For starters, people do not like uncertainty; at least 
many people do not like many types of uncertainty. This is what 
economists mean when they say that an individual is risk-averse. To 
put the point somewhat technically, a risk-averse individual is 
someone who, when comparing a certain dollar amount with an 
uncertain prospect of the same expected value, prefers the former. In 
other words, those who are risk-averse are willing to pay something -
at least an actuarially fair insurance premium (a premium equal to the 
weighted probability of the loss multiplied by the magnitude) - to 
shift a risk of loss to an insurance company. Although there is plenty 
of evidence of risk-preferring behavior out there as well, from 
organized gambling to bungee jumping, it is generally assumed that 
many individuals are risk-averse with respect to many types of risks 
that involve a small likelihood of a large potential loss.61 Substantive 
legal risk or uncertainty can fall into this category as well.62 What this 
means is that legal risk is something that most people would pay to 
avoid, which in turn means that social welfare would be enhanced if 
legal risk could be reduced or eliminated at a cost less than what 
59 See infra Part III (discussing tax preparer services) . 
60 John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on 
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 968 (1984). 
61 In one of the all time great examples of circular reasoning, the assumption 
that individuals are in fact risk-averse derives largely from the observation that 
individuals behave as if risk-averse - such as by purchasing insurance. 
62 I use the terms "risk" and "uncertainty" interchangeably here. Their 
technical meanings, as the terms are used by economists and insurance experts, are in 
fact different, but that difference is not important for current purposes. 
2005] Tax Law Uncertainty and Tax Insurance 371 
people are willing to pay to shed it. 
That, in a nutshell, is why legal risk or legal uncertainty can be a 
bad thing from the perspective of individual consumers or taxpayers. 
This same explanation would apply to any corporate taxpayer that is 
privately owned and to any partnership arrangement in which the 
partners are individuals.63 It is a little harder to understand, however, 
why a corporation whose stock is publicly traded would be averse to 
legal uncertainty. In theory, most if not all of the shareholders of a 
public corporation are diversified, meaning they own shares in enough 
companies and in enough industries whose risks are not correlated 
with each other that they - the shareholders - are actually 
indifferent as to the risks that affect any individual company. In other 
words, a fully diversified shareholder is concerned only with economy­
wide risks and how the stocks in their portfolios respond to economy­
wide fluctuations, not with any firm-specific risk. The uncertainty as 
to how the laws, including the tax laws, will be applied to a particular 
corporation's circumstances, such as to a particular transaction, is one 
such firm-specific risk. Given this fact, if managers of public 
corporations were acting as loyal agents for their diversified 
shareholders, they should likewise behave as if they are risk-neutral 
with respect to firm-specific risks, including legal risks - including, 
even more specifically, tax law risks. And yet public corporations buy 
liability insurance all the time. Moreover, many of the tax risk 
insurance policies that have been sold were purchased by public 
corporations. Why would that happen if shareholders are in fact risk­
neutral? 
There are a number of possible explanations.64 First, even if 
corporate shareholders are risk-neutral, corporate managers, 
including tax managers, may well be risk-averse with respect to certain 
types of catastrophic, potentially bankrupting, liabilities. This might 
be so, for example, if managers have nondiversifiable human capital at 
risk in their respective companies. Moreover, even if the potential 
legal risks do not threaten to bankrupt the company, a negative, 
uninsured legal outcome may end the careers of corporate managers, 
63 Although one might reasonably assume that entrepreneurs are less risk-averse 
than the average individual, it might still be the case that such investors or business 
people prefer to limit or eliminate some types of risk - that is, even risk neutral or 
risk seeking entrepreneurs often want to limit the domain of their risk taking 
behavior, and this can be done through the purchase of insurance. 
64 For a list of explanations for the corporate demand for insurance, see David 
Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 55 J. Bus. 
281 (1982). 
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a prospect that would certainly be enough to make corporate 
managers risk-averse with respect to such liabilities. And, indeed, this 
is thought to be the case with the risk of a tax penalty assessment.65 
Second, the purchase of insurance by a corporation might be thought 
of as a means of securing reliable, bonded advice regarding how to 
minimize losses. That is, insurers may be seen as experts in risk 
management, and by selling an insurance policy to the corporation, 
the insurer has also agreed in effect to give the insured corporation 
the benefit of its expertise in reducing insured risks. Moreover, the 
advice is bonded, in the sense that the insurer has agreed to be on the 
hook for the resulting losses if its risk-reduction advice is followed.66 
As will be discussed more fully below, a case can be made that tax risk 
insurance serves this bonded-advice function as well. Finally, if we 
take at face value the explanations that corporate managers of large 
corporations often provide to justify their purchases of corporate 
insurance, and if we take seriously the pitch that insurance brokers 
use to market insurance policies to corporate risk managers, the best 
explanations for the purchase of insurance - including tax risk 
insurance - by public corporations may depend on the assumption 
that there is some level of risk-aversion, or perhaps some level of 
residual irrationality, among investors. A simplified version of this 
story goes as follows: Management is worried that, if there is a large 
unforeseen liability in a particular year, whether a tort judgment or a 
tax deficiency, will cause a "shock" to, or a surprise downward 
movement in, reported earnings. The catch is that such a shock to 
earning can cause investors to overreact, leading to a drop in share 
price, which even if temporary can have consequences for the 
company by raising the cost of capital.67 Thus, if a corporation 
discovers a new potential liability and books a reserve for it on its 
financial statements, such a reserve, if large, can affect share price and 
in turn the cost of capital. Insurance provides a means of eliminating 
such shocks. Instead of waiting for the large loss to occur and 
expensing it then, and instead of booking a reserve in anticipation of 
the loss's occurrence, the corporation can simply pay a premium to an 
insurance company and shift the risk to the insurer. Such an insurance 
transaction in effect removes the liability from the insured­
corporation's balance sheet. In any event, however one describes this 
capital-market-shock theory, it amounts to a type of risk-aversion on 
65 See Bankman, supra note 7, at 1784. 
66 See Mayers & Smith, supra note 64, at 288--89. 
67 It can also have consequences for management compensation, which might 
itself produce risk-aversion among managers. 
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the part of corporate investors, even supposedly diversified ones. 
The foregoing is an account of why individuals and corporations 
purchase insurance; thus, in a sense it is an account of the costs of 
uncertainty, including tax law uncertainty. Besides this general cost of 
risk-bearing associated with legal uncertainty, there is another cost as 
well. Legal uncertainty can induce taxpayers, especially risk-averse 
taxpayers, to over-comply with the law in various ways. Taxpayers 
could manifest over-compliance in a number of ways, such as changing 
the structure of their transactions, deciding not to engage in the 
transaction in question, or engaging the transaction as planned but 
without taking advantage of the more favorable tax treatment to 
which they are arguably - though by assumption not certainly -
entitled. One way of understanding this sort of over-compliance is to 
refer back to the tax compliance continuum. Over-compliance, for 
example, might mean that taxpayers would tend to avoid taking 
positions that approached the more-likely-than-not threshold - that 
is, they would stay comfortably to the right of Point C - by avoiding 
even remotely questionable transactions or reporting positions. All of 
these types of over-compliance constitute social waste and can even 
produce distributional inequities insofar as the effects of the legal 
uncertainty and differential risk-bearing are unfairly distributed across 
68 taxpayers. 
68 Note that the existence of substantive legal uncertainty can cause distortions 
in taxpayer behavior even if taxpayers are neutral with respect to risk. Calfee & 
Craswell, supra note 60, at 1002-03. This can occur, for example, if the legal standard 
being applied takes a form similar to a negligence rule, under which the individual or 
firm can avoid the entire penalty if they merely, and only barely, satisfy a threshold 
standard of care. The intuition behind this somewhat counter-intuitive point can be 
illustrated in an example from tort law. Imagine that a product-safety standard says 
merely that product manufacturers should make their products reasonably safe, with 
"reasonably safe" meaning "cost-justifiably safe," taking into account the full social 
costs of accidents caused by the product. Assume further that what this means ideally 
is that, for example, a maker of $200 lawnmowers should invest $25 per mower to 
install the latest foot protection technology. Anything less than that investment 
would be considered negligent in a tort case in the event of an injury; anything more 
than that would be unnecessary and inefficient, because it would force consumers to 
purchase a safer product than is necessary under the circumstances. If the legal 
standard is uncertain, and the manufacturer cannot determine ex ante precisely what 
the cost-effective safety device is, and if the penalty for noncompliance is large 
enough, the manufacturer may have an incentive to install, say, a $27 (or $30 or $35) 
foot protector instead of the efficient $25 one in order to eliminate the threat of 
potential liability - which disappears entirely when the threshold of reasonable care 
has been met. This theoretical possibility of over-compliance, which again applies 
even in the absence of risk-aversion on the part of the regulated party, though risk-
374 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 25:339 
Given the nature of tax law, with its mixture of complex, 
sometimes inscrutable rules and background anti-avoidance 
standards, it is inevitable that there will be some measure of 
substantive legal uncertainty. The existence of such uncertainty can 
lead to behavioral distortions, inefficient risk bearing, and both under­
and over-compliance with the tax laws. What if anything should be 
done about this? One answer is: nothing. Perhaps since the current 
penalties for tax noncompliance and the probability of detection are 
so low - too low to produce optimal compliance incentives - a case 
can be made for using tax law uncertainty as a second-best form of 
deterrence. That is, given the existing incentives to under-comply 
with the tax laws, maybe the deterrence value of a little legal 
uncertainty will at least help to even things out. Indeed, the only thing 
preventing some taxpayers from being more aggressive in their tax 
planning may be the residual level of uncertainty within the tax laws.69 
And this might even be Congress's intent; lawmakers may have left 
some uncertainties in the tax laws with the hope in mind that 
taxpayers, seeking to avoid uncertainty, would err on the side of 
caution. That is possible. But if that were Congress's intent, it has not 
done a good job of saying so. Moreover, using such legal uncertainty 
in this way is a fairly imprecise tool for deterring aggressive tax 
aversion exacerbates the effect, has been demonstrated in the context of tort 
standards. Id. at 990. It would also apply to the context of tax enforcement. Thus, 
for example, a taxpayer facing uncertainty as to how the IRS or a court will apply, say, 
the economic substance or business purpose doctrines to the taxpayer's particular 
transaction might decide to over-comply with the law by building into the transaction 
an excessive amount of nontax business risk, just to ensure compliance with the 
standards and thus avoid underpayment penalties, even though such additional risk is 
pure economic waste. Of course, an anti-avoidance standard that ends up inducing 
some taxpayers to structure some transactions with some amount of real economic 
risk or substantive business investment that they would not have otherwise, in the 
absence of the standard, can be optimal overall. One of the ways that anti-avoidance 
standards work is to create such "frictions" that hinder or limit the extent to which 
taxpayers can achieve both (a) the economic substance they are seeking and (b) that 
tax treatment they are seeking. Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate 
Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221 (July 10, 2000) (explaining 
that a function of the economic substance doctrine is to impose frictions on aggressive 
tax planning). My point is that uncertainty in the tax laws can produce excessive 
friction which may alter or inhibit transactions that are welfare enhancing. 
69 For a formal analysis of the effects of tax law and tax enforcement uncertainty 
on reported income and on aggregate social welfare, see Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel 
Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 17 (1989). The authors 
do not argue that behavioral effects of tax law uncertainty will precisely offset the 
behavioral effects of insufficient penalties. They do note, however, that the two can 
act as substitutes for each other. 
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planning, since some taxpayers will be induced to over-comply and 
others, the less risk-averse, will be inclined to take a chance and 
exploit the ambiguity. In addition, there are better responses to tax 
under-compliance than the use of legal uncertainty. For example, the 
best response to suboptimal penalties or suboptimal detection rates is 
to increase one or the other, or both.70 Thus, maybe we should 
radically increase tax understatement penalties or spend more money 
on auditors, hiring more of them and training them better.71 If we 
take either of those steps, however, we would be right back where we 
started with the problem of legal uncertainty and the accompanying 
distortions and inequities due to potential over-compliance. Even if 
we fix the problem of under-deterrence by choosing the optimal 
balance of detection risk and penalties, we will still need to deal with 
the problem of legal uncertainty. What I want to explore in the 
remainder of this Article is a particular response to substantive legal 
uncertainty, a form of private insurance that has in recent years come 
into use by mostly sophisticated corporate taxpayers. In particular, I 
explore in some detail the benefits and costs of tax transaction 
insurance, and I compare it with the most obvious alternative: 
government provided legal uncertainty insurance. As we will see, 
insofar as tax insurance operates purely as coverage for substantive 
legal uncertainty or coverage for merits risk, it appears to be socially 
desirable. However, insofar as it operates as insurance against pure 
detection risk - i.e., if taxpayers were to buy coverage for tax 
positions that they knew were contrary to prevailing law - tax 
insurance may be problematic and perhaps should be limited or 
banned. 
Before I get to these arguments, however, let us review some of 
the facts about the existing market in tax insurance. First, I will take a 
brief detour to describe what might be called the old markets in tax 
insurance, which still thrive today, and then I will survey the new 
market, which is much smaller in scope at this point but is in many 
ways more interesting for its potential. 
70 Scotchmer and Slemrod demonstrate, however, that, under certain restrictive 
assumptions, the socially optimal level of tax law uncertainty is greater than zero. 
The intuition behind this point is that a marginal increase in tax law uncertainty can 
have the same deterrent effect on taxpayer reporting behavior as a more expensive 
investment in increased detection. Id. at 24-25. They would presumably agree, 
however, that there is a ceiling to the optimal amount of tax law uncertainty. 
71 My own view is that we should do both. 
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Ill. THE OLD MARKET IN T AX INSURANCE: TAX PREPARER (AND 
TAX ADVISOR) WARRANTIES AND TAX INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS 
This Part discusses three forerunners of tax transaction insurance: 
tax preparer warranties; tax advisor warranties, or contingent fee 
arrangements; and tax indemnity agreements. The first is discussed at 
some length, the latter two only briefly. Although these warranties 
differ from each other and from tax risk insurance, each involves some 
degree of shifting of tax law uncertainty from one party to another 
and thus can be understood as a form of tax insurance. What is 
especially interesting is that from the perspective of the Treasury 
Department, preparer warranties and indemnity agreements present 
no tax law enforcement concerns, whereas advisor warranties do. 
Why this is so is a question explored below.72 
A. Tax Preparer Warranties 
Long before there were tax indemnity insurance policies, there 
was a type of tax insurance that is still sold to millions of individual 
taxpayers today. These are the warranties provided by tax return 
preparers for their clients.73 Although the content of these warranties 
varies from one tax preparer to another, there is a considerable 
degree of overlap.74 The typical preparer warranty provides that if the 
72 See infra text accompanying notes 85-89. 
73 Under state insurance laws, the regulatory definition of the term "insurance" 
does not typically encompass service or product warranties. See, e.g. , State ex rel. 
Duffy v. W. Auto Supply Co., 16 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ohio 1938) ("A warranty promises 
indemnity against defects in the article sold, while insurance indemnifies against loss 
or damage resulting from perils outside of and unrelated to defects in the article 
itself."). This means that those companies issuing warranties need not qualify as 
insurance companies or meet all of the requirements, including solvency 
requirements, imposed on such companies by state law. I have found one instance, 
however, in which a state insurance regulator treated a particular tax preparer 
warranty as insurance for state insurance regulatory purposes. Office of Gen. 
Counsel, State of N.Y. Ins. Dep't., Treatment of Tax Preparer's Warranty (2000), 
available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/rg003281.htm (concluding that any tax preparer 
warranty that covered losses beyond those caused by preparer errors would constitute 
insurance for regulatory purposes.) 
74 For the purposes of this study, I have focused on the warranties provided by 
H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt that are publicly available on their respective web 
sites. H&R Block, Professional Services, http://www.hrblock.com/taxes/products/ 
product.jsp?productld=43&otpPartnerid=2054&Partnerid=2054 (describing H&R 
Block's "Peace of Mind" warranty); Jackson Hewitt, Tax Liability Protection, 
http.!lwww.jacksonhewitt.com/products_gold.asp (describing Jackson Hewitt's "Gold 
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preparer makes a mistake in preparing the taxpayer's return and that 
error results in the Service's assessing interest and penalty charges 
against the taxpayer, the preparer will cover those additional costs. 
Most preparers further narrow the standard coverage by specifying 
that the coverage is triggered only by calculation errors on the 
preparer's part; some preparers, however, are less specific about 
precisely what sort of error will trigger coverage. 
In any event, the standard tax preparer warranty typically limits 
coverage to preparer errors of some kind and thus leaves taxpayers 
themselves responsible for any interest or penalties caused by their 
own mistakes or malfeasance. For example, if a taxpayer fails to tell 
the tax preparer of some item of gross income that she received in a 
given year and the preparer leaves that item off the taxpayer's return, 
or if the taxpayer simply provides incorrect numbers with respect to 
some item of income or deduction, any resulting penalties and interest 
would be the responsibility of the taxpayer. If the preparer commits 
an error, however, the standard warranty covers any resulting penalty 
and interest. This standard warranty is provided by most tax 
preparation firms and most tax preparation web sites and software 
companies; and the price for this coverage is typically included in the 
basic cost of the service.75 
Conspicuously absent from the standard tax preparer warranty is 
coverage for underpaid taxes. That is, they cover penalties and 
interest but not the underpaid taxes themselves. This is not to say that 
tax underpayment warranties are never offered. They are, but they 
Guarantee" warranty). According to one source, H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt 
together handle roughly sixteen percent of all individual federal income tax returns 
filed with the Service. ALAN BERUBE ET AL., CI'R. ON URBAN & METRO. POLICY, THE 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION & THE PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., THE PRICE OF PAYING 
TAXES: How TAX PREPARATION AND REFUND LOAN FEES ERODE THE BENEFITS OF 
THE EITC 4 (2002), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/ 
berubekimeitc.pdf (reviewing data from companies' annual reports). In addition to 
the H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt examples, I have spoken with several 
accountants, as well as with others familiar with the tax preparation industry, about 
the use and typical content of tax preparer warranties. 
75 For example, Turbo Tax provides the following standard warranty with its 
online product: "We are so confident in the accuracy of TurboTax for the Web that 
it's 100% Guaranteed Accurate. Rest assured, if you ever have to pay an IRS or state 
penalty or interest because of a TurboTax calculations error, we'll pay you the 
penalty and interest." TurboTax Guaranteed 100% Accurate, 
http://www.turbotax.com/tax_products/turbotax_advantages/guaranteed_accurate_onl 
ine_tax_prep.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). 
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are generally offered separately as a "rider" to the basic warranty.76 
Furthermore, although tax deficiency coverage is offered by some 
preparers, it would not be surprising if taxpayers rarely opted to buy 
it. It is not that tax deficiencies are never large and unpredictable 
enough to motivate a demand for insurance. Indeed, as will be 
discussed in the next Part, it is the risk of a large unexpected tax 
deficiency, rather than the risk of penalties, that seems to generate 
most of the recent demand for tax indemnity insurance.77 The biggest 
difference between the tax indemnity or tax transaction insurance 
market and the market for tax preparation warranties is the relative 
magnitude of the risks. For most individual taxpayers who have a 
return preparer do their returns, as compared to the corporate 
taxpayers who are purchasing tax indemnity policies, the amount of 
the potential tax deficiency is relatively small, not only in absolute 
terms but relative to the overall tax liability. A major reason for this 
is that most individual taxpayers - and certainly the ones who have 
hired tax return preparers to file their returns - are not likely to be 
engaged in some sort of aggressive shelter transaction, which by 
definition puts substantial tax dollars at risk. Rather, they have 
decided to use a professional preparer or tax preparation software 
because they find the tax laws to be too complex to manage on their 
own. Such taxpayers typically do not go to return preparers for tax 
shelter advice, but only for help in preparing their returns.78 
Moreover, individual taxpayers who decide to take aggressive 
positions on their returns may do so regardless of the advice of their 
preparers. This suggests another reason why return preparation firms 
would be reluctant to provide coverage against tax deficiencies. That 
76 Both H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt, for example, offer special extended 
warranties that, for an additional fee, provide coverage for underpaid taxes. In both 
cases, however, the amount of coverage for underpaid taxes is capped - $5,000 for 
H&R Block and $6,000 for Jackson Hewitt. Also, in both cases, coverage is triggered 
by the preparer's error. Thus, combining both the standard and the extended 
warranties, if an H&R Block or Jackson Hewitt tax return preparer makes an error 
on a return, either a computational error or an error in interpreting the law, and the 
Service catches this mistake and issues a deficiency notice to the taxpayer requiring 
additional taxes plus interest and penalties, the company will pay all of the penalties 
and interest, as under the standard warranty, plus up to the policy limits in back taxes. 
n Few, if any, of the types of transactions that have been the subject of tax 
transaction insurance are of the sort that would be likely to give rise to penalties. 
78 This conclusion, which is my own educated guess, does not mean that the use 
of return preparers overall necessarily enhances the accuracy of tax filings. There is, 
in fact, literature on this question, and the answer is that it depends. See infra note 80 
and accompanying text. 
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is, if the risks are large, tax preparation firms may simply not be 
willing to take on the extra risk. Put differently, just as most product 
manufacturers would prefer not to become insurers for the 
consequential harms associated with their products and thus typically 
attempt to disclaim such warranties, it is possible that many tax return 
preparers simply do not wish to become the insurers of their 
customers' overall tax liability. In addition, even if the tax 
preparation firms were willing to take on the additional risk, they may 
not wish to take on the extra regulatory burdens, including licensure 
and solvency requirements, associated with being "engaged in the 
business of insurance" for state regulatory purposes. Such regulatory 
burdens would be more likely if the return preparer sold tax­
deficiency coverage in addition to the basic warranties.79 
A final observation about tax preparer warranties is that they also 
typically include a modest commitment to assist the taxpayer in the 
event of an audit. This guarantee entails a promise to help the 
taxpayer in the event of an audit to answer basic questions regarding 
how his or her return was prepared and how the various numbers 
were calculated. The guarantee, however, specifically declines to 
promise full-fledged legal representation; to the contrary, it expressly 
disclaims that obligation. Interestingly, tax preparers also sometimes 
guarantee that if the taxpayer overpays his or her taxes and does so as 
a result of the preparer's error (typically, only if it is a calculation 
error), the preparer will assist in filing an amended return to recover 
the excess taxes paid and will reimburse the taxpayer for any interest 
on that amount. Thus, tax insurance against errors on the part of tax 
preparers, which again has been in existence for some time, can be 
symmetrical, covering calculation errors in both directions. 
The foregoing is a rough picture of the market for tax preparation 
warranties. In their current form, these warranties have certain 
characteristics that are common to other service and product 
warranties, characteristics that suggest the contracts are harmless and 
perhaps even socially beneficial. However, under certain conditions, 
one can imagine that these warranties, like other "small print" 
language in standard form contracts, might present consumer­
protection issues. That is, if the consumers who purchase the 
warranties are asymmetrically uninformed or systematically 
misperceive the risks being insured, government regulation may be 
appropriate. The case for such intervention would be no different 
from that for other consumer product warranties. This sort of 
79 See Office of Gen. Counsel, State of N.Y. Ins. Dep't., supra note 73. 
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regulation is typically done at the state level either by state attorneys 
general enforcing state consumer protection laws or by state insurance 
regulators if the warranties happen to qualify as insurance. 
The more pertinent question for the purposes of this Article is 
whether tax preparation warranties - at least the ones comparable to 
those offered by the large tax preparation firms - present any tax law 
enforcement or compliance concerns. The answer seems to be that, 
although the use of tax preparers may have some negative effects on 
taxpayer compliance (as well as some positive effects), there is no 
obvious compliance cost or benefit associated with the warranties per 
se. That is, the existence of these warranties probably does not by 
itself create an incentive for insured taxpayers to take overly 
aggressive positions on their tax returns. Whether an individual 
taxpayer's use of expert assistance in preparing a tax return leads to 
increased or reduced compliance is a question that has been studied 
by economists. Within that literature, one of the more interesting 
hypotheses is that tax return preparers, and perhaps tax advisors more 
generally, (a) tend to increase compliance with complex but clear legal 
rules but (b) tend to reduce compliance or increase noncompliance 
with rules that are more ambiguous or uncertain. Put differently, tax 
preparers are "rule enforcers" and "ambiguity exploiters."80 With 
respect to clear but complex rules, individual, presumably 
unsophisticated taxpayers may inadvertently fail to comply simply 
from lack of understanding. In those cases, hired tax experts, who are 
able to decipher these complex rules and wish to avoid tax preparer 
penalties, will tend to correct such inadvertent clear errors, producing 
greater overall compliance with such provisions. For this optimistic 
conclusion to follow, it must be assumed that (a) return preparers are 
better able to understand such complex provisions than can the 
taxpayers who hire them, and (b) although the rules are complex they 
are clear, giving tax experts an incentive to counsel in favor of 
compliance. This latter assumption would hold because 
noncompliance in this context would in effect amount to evasion, 
which would subject not only the taxpayer but the preparer to near­
certain, potentially severe penalties in the event of audit. By contrast, 
where the legal requirements are more ambiguous - or, to use the 
language from the previous Part, more standard-like - the overall 
80 See, e.g. , Brian Erard , Taxation with Representation: An Analysis of the Role 
of Tax Practitioners in Tax Compliance, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 163, 164 (1993); Steven 
Klepper et al., Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The Case of Tax 
Preparers; 34 J.L. & ECON. 205, 207 (1991); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Role 
of Tax Preparers in Tax Compliance, 22 POLICY Sci. 167 (1989). 
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effect on compliance rates of using a preparer may cut in the opposite 
direction. This would be true if unsophisticated individual taxpayers 
tend to react to ambiguity by over-complying - if, for example, they 
do not take deductions to which they are not sure they are entitled. 
On the other hand, sophisticated tax preparers react to the same 
ambiguity less risk-aversely and are willing to take calculated risk. In 
terms of the tax compliance continuum in Figure 1 above, many 
unsophisticated, risk-averse individual taxpayers may tend to stay 
relatively close to Point B. By contrast, return preparers, better able 
to make the probabilistic calculations necessary to avoid penalties due 
to their superior tax expertise, may be more likely to take positions 
closer to Point C. There is at least some evidence to suggest that these 
conditions do hold in some settings and that the rule­
enforcer/ambiguity-exploiter hypothesis may have some real world 
validity, although the evidence is not beyond dispute and the policy 
implications are not clear. 
In any event, whatever the outcome of that debate, it does not 
bear directly on the question of warranties or insurance. Whether 
paid preparers on balance have good, bad, or no effects on taxpayer 
compliance decisions overall, the fact that preparers tend to provide 
warranties for their work by itself does not yet seem to present a large 
tax compliance problem. Indeed, the Treasury Department has 
completely ignored these tax preparer warranties, presumably on the 
assumption that they pose no serious threat to the fisc.81 The one way 
in which such warranties might present a problem would be if the 
promise of tax penalty insurance/warranties induced taxpayers to take 
more aggressive positions or to allow their return preparers to take 
more aggressive positions on their behalf. This is certainly possible. 
Just as aggressive tax planning can be in the self-interest of both 
sophisticated taxpayers and their advisors, it can also be in the self­
interest of average individual taxpayers and their return preparers to 
be aggressive; and the use of warranties could conceivably encourage 
this sort of behavior. However, it is unlikely that this would become a 
significant tax compliance problem for middle or lower income 
taxpayers who use the large return preparation firms. These are not 
taxpayers with the resources or incentives to engage in complex quasi­
legal tax shelter transactions of the sort that would appeal to wealthy 
or corporate taxpayers who (a) have more absolute tax dollars and a 
81 As we shall see in a moment, however, the Treasury Department has not been 
as sanguine about what I call tax advisor warranties. See infra text accompanying 
notes 82-89. 
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higher percentage of their income at stake in the tax avoidance game 
and (b) can hire expensive tax lawyers and accountants to help them 
with their tax planning. Moreover, given the nature of the wholesale 
tax preparation business, tax return preparation firms are simply not 
in a position to provide this sort of complicated tax shelter planning 
advice. 
In sum, a case can be made that tax preparer warranties efficiently 
allocate the risk of tax preparer mistake to the obvious cheapest-cost­
avoider and best insurer, the tax preparer. Moreover, at least with 
respect to the large retail tax preparation firms, there seem to be 
relatively few tax compliance problems associated with the use of 
warranties, although whether the use of tax return preparers itself 
increases or decreases compliance is an open question. 
B. Tax Advisor Warranties (a.k.a. Contingent Fee Arrangements) 
Tax return preparers are not the only tax professionals providing 
implicit or explicit service warranties. Based on my conversations 
with tax attorneys and accountants, a type of warranty is also 
sometimes provided by tax advisors who provide taxpayers with 
expert opinions as to the appropriate or likely tax treatment of 
particular transactions.82 These warranties have some attributes in 
common with return preparation warranties and some attributes in 
common with tax transaction insurance, although they are different in 
important respects as well. Like tax transaction insurance, these 
warranties apply to specific opinions offered by the advisor with 
respect to particular tax issues; they do not apply to the taxpayer's 
entire tax return. Tax preparer warranties by contrast apply to the 
entire return, as the preparation of the entire return is the service 
being warranted. Like tax preparer warranties, however, tax advisor 
warranties offer less-than-full indemnity for losses. That is, unlike tax 
indemnity or tax transaction insurance policies, tax advisor warranties 
do not cover taxpayers against the possibility of penalties, interest, or 
82 By "tax advisor" here I mean someone who advises a taxpayer regarding (a) 
how to structure a given transaction so as to minimize taxes, and then (b) how to 
report that transaction on the taxpayer's return. The advisor therefore is providing 
expertise on the tax law as it applies to a particular situation and is involved in so­
called tax planning. By "tax return preparer" I mean someone who fills out the tax 
return itself. Obviously, the preparer may give some legal advice on how to report 
certain issues; thus, the distinction does not always hold up. One can still usefully 
distinguish, however, between the H&R Blocks of the world and the lawyers and 
accountants that give more specialized transactional advice on specific issues, usually 
to corporate or wealthy individual taxpayers. 
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tax deficiencies themselves, but take the form of a money-back 
guarantee: if the particular issue on which the advisor gave an opinion 
ends up being challenged on audit and rejected by the Service and a 
court, the advisor agrees to refund some or all of the fees that were 
charged for the advice.83 Such an arrangement can be an explicit 
element of the service contract between the advisor and the taxpayer. 
It is more likely to be part of an implicit understanding, however.84 
In effect, these tax advisor warranties amount to a form of 
contingent fee arrangement for tax advisors.85 What is interesting is 
that the Treasury Department apparently regards such arrangements 
as presenting significant tax compliance concerns. This can be seen in 
Circular 230, the regulations governing the standards of practice 
before the Service, which specifically prohibits those admitted to 
practice before the Service from using contingent fee arrangements, 
except in circumstances in which the advisor is giving advice with 
respect to an amended return.86 Relatedly, the Treasury Regulations 
83 There may also be implicit arrangements under which tax advisors agree to 
indemnify the taxpayers against back taxes, interest, and penalties in the event the 
Service disallows a particular tax issue. Something like this was involved in Clark v. 
Commissioner, although that may have been a one-time spontaneous transfer and not 
part of an implicit indemnification contract. 40 B .T.A. 333 (1939), nonacq. 1939-2 
C.B. 45; nonacq. withdrawn and acq. , 1957-2 C.B. 3. I suspect, however, that such 
indemnification arrangements are rare. An alternative version of this type of tax 
advisor indemnification would be the existence of potential legal malpractice claims 
against tax advisors who issue advice that is below industry standards. Given how low 
industry standards have fallen, however, this coverage is largely illusory except in the 
most egregious shelter cases. 
84 As far as I am aware, there is no published data on the prevalence of these 
arrangements. I have been told by some tax lawyers that it is common. Other 
lawyers have told me, however, that these arrangements are common only among 
shelter promoters, which would explain why the Treasury Department is so 
concerned about these arrangements. Again, the distinction between a tax shelter 
and mere tax planning is notoriously difficult to draw. 
85 Most lawyers think of contingent fee arrangements as having the following 
structure: the lawyer gets paid a percentage of the favorable outcome, which in a tax 
case would be the "tax savings" from the transaction in question. However, such an 
arrangement could be structured as follows: the tax advisor charges an hourly rate or 
a set fee for given transaction, and if the tax characterization of the transaction is 
disallowed by the Service and Courts, the advisor must refund a portion or all of the 
fees. Either approach is a form of contingent fee arrangement and could be 
structured to provide identical incentives and risk allocation. 
86 In those regulations, a contingent fee is defined as follows: 
[A] contingent fee is any fee that is based, in whole or in part, on whether 
or not a position taken on a tax return or other filing avoids challenge by 
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that define the category of tax shelter transactions that taxpayers are 
required to flag for the Service as so-called "reportable transactions" 
include transactions that have "contractual protection," which 
essentially means those involving contingent fee arrangements.87 
These two sets of regulations - Circular 230 and the reportable­
transaction regulations - seem to work together as follows: tax 
advisors who want to maintain their ability to practice before the 
Service and avoid Circular 230 penalties may not charge contingency 
fees or structure their fees in any way to provide contractual 
protection on a "reportable transaction,'' as defined under Code 
the Internal Revenue Service or is sustained either by the Internal Revenue 
Service or in litigation. A contingent fee includes any fee arrangement in 
which the practitioner will reimburse the client for all or a portion of the 
client's fee in the event that a position taken on a tax return or other filing 
is challenged by the Internal Revenue Service or is not sustained, whether 
pursuant to an indemnity agreement, a guarantee, rescission rights, or any 
other arrangement with a similar effect. 
31 C.F.R. § 10.27(b)(l) (2002). Circular 230 then provides: 
A practitioner may not charge a contingent fee for preparing an original tax 
return or for any advice rendered in connection with a position taken or to 
be taken on an original tax return . 
. . . A contingent fee may be charged for preparation of or advice in 
connection with an amended tax return or a claim for refund (other than a 
claim for refund made on an original tax return), but only if the practitioner 
reasonably anticipates at the time the fee arrangement is entered into that 
the amended tax return or refund claim will receive substantive review by 
the Internal Revenue Service. 
Id. § 10.27(b)(2)-(3). 
87 Treas. Reg. § 1 .6011-4 (2003) requires taxpayers to report transactions that 
involve "contractual protection," which is defined as follows: 
A transaction with contractual protection is a transaction for which the 
taxpayer or a related party . . .  has the right to a full or partial refund of fees 
(as described in paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section) if all or part of the 
intended tax consequences from the transaction are not sustained. A 
transaction with contractual protection also is a transaction for which fees 
(as described in paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this section) are contingent on the 
taxpayer's realization of tax benefits from the transaction. All the facts and 
circumstances relating to the transaction will be considered when 
determining whether a fee is refundable or contingent, including the right 
to reimbursements of amounts that the parties to the transaction have not 
designated as fees or any agreement to provide services without reasonable 
compensation. 
Id. § l .6011-4(b)(4)(i). 
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section 6011 ,  even if the transaction is reported to the Service by the 
taxpayer, unless the transaction involves a claim for a refund. If the 
transaction involves a claim for a refund, however, not only is a 
contingent fee arrangement allowed, there is an exception to the 
reporting requirement for the taxpayer as well. In any event, the 
Treasury Department seems to be concerned about contingent fee or 
warranty arrangements between tax advisors and taxpayers but is 
apparently not the least concerned about tax preparer warranties of 
the sort described above88 that promise, not reimbursement of fees, 
but coverage of back taxes, penalties, and interest.89 The difference in 
Treasury concern probably makes some sense, because of differences 
. in the two markets. Tax return preparers are dealing with relatively 
simple returns for mostly low and middle income individuals and are 
less likely to be involved in aggressive shelter-type activity; whereas at 
least some tax advisors are actively working in the tax shelter market. 
Indeed, some lawyers have told me that the only tax advisors who use 
contingent fee arrangements are those involved in shelter activity. In 
any event, the concern with these regulations is that they are over­
inclusive and require reporting, or have the effect of forbidding 
contingent fees, in circumstances in which there is no special concern 
about aggressive avoidance. I will return to this issue below after I 
have outlined the nature of and problems with the tax transaction or 
tax indemnity insurance market. 
C. Tax Indemnity Agreements 
Although tax preparer and tax advisor warranties have some 
aspects in common with tax indemnity insurance policies, if there is a 
single forerunner of the new market in tax insurance, it is the humble 
tax indemnity agreement, which is often structured as a special 
addendum to the standard "Representations and Warranties" section 
of most buy-sell agreements. So-called tax indemnity provisions have 
long been a part of contracts involving the purchase and sale of 
businesses; and it is not difficult to see why: Whenever one business 
acquires, merges with, or purchases another, there will always be some 
legal uncertainty that needs to be allocated. And one of the parties to 
the deal is likely to be in a better position to bear the risk. For 
example, the seller may, for whatever reason, be especially risk-averse 
and thus may wish to shed any risk of environmental liability that 
88 See supra text accompanying notes 73-81. 
89 Neither Circular 230 nor any other regulations address tax preparer 
warranties. See 31 C.F.R..§ 10.27 (2002). 
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might accompany the business that it is selling. Indeed, that may be a 
main reason behind the sale. In that case, the seller might enter into a 
contractual arrangement shifting primary responsibility for 
environmental liability risks to the purchaser - in effect, making the 
purchaser the insurer of the environmental liabilities of the target 
business. Alternatively, the buyer may be more risk-averse and may 
want to avoid assuming any unknown environmental risks from the 
seller. Thus, the buyer may insist that the seller assume responsibility 
for those risks before closing the deal. Which of the parties will be the 
one to whom the risk is allocated will depend on a number of factors, 
including who is the better risk bearer - i.e., who has more assets 
over which to spread the potential loss or who has better access to 
capital markets - or who has better information about the risk. As 
mentioned, such indemnity agreements are common in transactions 
involving business purchases or mergers. Tax law risk is commonly 
allocated in the same way. Contracting parties frequently allocate 
between them the responsibility for potential tax liabilities through 
the use of tax indemnity agreements that become an integral part of 
the overall transaction.9() 
As we shall see in the next Part, tax indemnity or tax transaction 
insurance policies can be viewed as the next logical step in the 
evolution of these contracts. That is, instead of shifting the legal risk 
from buyer to seller or vice versa the strategy now is to shift that risk 
to a third-party insurer. Especially interesting is that although such 
contractual efforts to shift legal risk between buyers and sellers have 
been around for a long time, they do not seem to have been a source 
of regulatory scrutiny. With regard to tax indemnity agreements 
specifically, nothing suggests that the Service or the Treasury has any 
90 Lewis M. Horowitz, Excludability of Tax Indemnification Payments 
Threatened by Recent Change in IRS Position: PLR 9014046, 49 TAX NOTES 799, 799 
(Nov. 12, 1990) (observing that tax indemnity agreements are used when "one party 
represents to the other that certain tax benefits will be derived under the contract. 
Because the anticipated tax treatment usually affects the economic viability of the 
contractual arrangement, the representing party typically indemnifies the other in the 
event the represented tax benefits are not realized."); Robert W. Wood & Dominic L. 
Daher, Beating a Dead Horse: Tax Indemnity Payments to Ex-Spouses, 101 TAX 
NOTES 875, 875 (Nov. 17, 2003) ("Tax indemnity payments are common features of 
many transactions, such as litigation settlement agreements, merger documents, 
purchase and sale agreements, leases, and so forth. Regardless of the context, in 
general, they say: 'If you get taxed as a result of the transaction, I'll cover it."'). A 
sample of a tax indemnity agreement can be found online: FindLaw - Tax Allocation 
and Indemnity Agreement, http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/agreements/ 
parkplace/hilton.tax.1998.12.31 .htrnl (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). 
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concerns about such transactions. The same cannot be said, however, 
for tax indemnity insurance. 
IV. THE NEW MARKET IN TAX INSURANCE 
Tax indemnity or transactional tax risk insurance policies differ 
from traditional tax preparer or tax advisor warranties and tax 
indemnity agreements in several respects. First, tax insurance policies 
are not warranties. Neither are they merely contractual agreements 
that allocate risks between two parties who are also contracting on 
other issues. Rather, tax indemnity policies are, as the name suggests, 
full-fledged insurance policies issued by real insurance companies that 
are regulated as such. Thus, when a tax insurance policy is purchased, 
certain tax risks are transferred to an insurance company, which then 
pools and distributes the risks across its other insureds and which 
sometimes reinsures some portion of those risks with other insurance 
companies. A second general difference between tax risk insurance 
and preparer warranties in particular is that the former are not mass­
marketed in standardized forms to individuals for relatively small 
risks, as are tax preparer warranties. Rather, tax transaction 
insurance is a type of custom-designed and individually-negotiated 
insurance. It is sold exclusively to wealthy and commercially 
sophisticated, typically corporate taxpayers seeking to cover large tax­
related risks - potential tax liabilities in the millions, tens of millions, 
and even hundreds of millions of dollars. That the policies are 
individually negotiated in this way may have consequences for how 
courts will interpret the language of the contracts, as courts sometimes 
treat standard form insurance contracts differently from individually 
negotiated ones. Finally, as already mentioned and as will be 
discussed further below, although tax preparer warranties cover an 
entire tax return, tax transaction policies are written on a transaction­
specific basis. They generally cover the tax treatment_ of particular tax 
transactions; they generally are not written to cover entire tax returns. 
A. The Content of Tax Insurance Policies 
Because they are not standard form contracts, it is difficult to 
describe the typical tax insurance policy. Nevertheless, there are 
enough important features in common that some general descriptive 
comments are possible.91 As already mentioned, tax insurance is a 
91 My knowledge of the tax indemnity insurance market and the content of the 
policies themselves derives from numerous conversations with individuals in the 
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form of liability insurance, where the liability risk is that of 
unexpected tax liabilities and penalties. Thus, tax insurance policies 
cover the risk that the Service will rule unfavorably with respect to 
some tax position that the taxpayer has taken or plans to take on its 
tax return. In this sense, then, tax insurance is a form of government 
sanction insurance. The policies typically cover the amount of the tax 
deficiency as well as any interest and penalties that are assessed up to 
the limits of the policy. These policy limits are set to equal a 
substantial fraction, sometimes all, of the potential tax liability, 
penalties, interest, and legal fees that might be incurred if the 
transaction in question is disallowed. Thus, for large corporate 
taxpayers, the policy limits can be in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars, although limits in the tens of millions are more common. The 
policies typically provide full "gross ups," which means that insofar as 
the insurance payouts themselves are considered income for tax 
purposes, the insurer will cover that additional tax as well and the 
resulting additional tax liability, and so on, "grossing up" the overall 
payment until the taxpayer is made whole on an after-tax basis. In 
this way the insurance aims to leave the taxpayer whole with respect 
to the risk of a negative tax ruling, with one exception: As do virtually 
all commercial liability insurance policies, tax indemnity policies 
include a substantial deductible, which is intended to help reduce 
moral hazard concerns. 92 
insurance industry who are involved in the design and marketing of these policies as 
well as with a number of tax lawyers who either have been hired to provide legal 
opinions to insurance companies or taxpayers regarding the purchase of such 
insurance. In addition, I have read many sample policies that were sent to me by 
insurers or by insurance brokers or that I downloaded directly from insurance­
company websites. To view a description of the nature and function of tax risk 
insurance and to see a model policy, see Am. Int'! Group, Inc., M&A North America: 
Tax Liability Insurance, http://www.aigmergerrisks.com/northamerica_tax.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2005). For the best published source on the nature and content of tax 
risk insurance policies by a tax practitioner, see generally Wolfe, supra note 1 .  
92 An interesting question, which cannot be  answered fully in  this Article, is 
whether a tax insurance premium is a deductible business expense and whether the 
proceeds from such policies are excludible from gross income. Commercial insurance 
premiums, including liability insurance premiums, paid by business taxpayers are 
generally considered ordinary and necessary business expenses under Code section 
162. Thus, they are generally deductible, subject to the economic performance rules 
under Code section 461(h) and subject to capitalization rules for multi-year policies. 
But what about tax liability insurance? It might be argued that the insurance 
premiums ought not be deductible, since the insurance is to cover payments which, if 
made by the taxpayer, would not be deductible (i.e., income tax payments). My 
guess, however, is that most taxpayers that purchase tax risk policies are deducting 
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As with standard commercial liability insurance policies, tax 
transaction policies offer coverage for the legal and accounting costs 
of contesting the tax liability, although the language here is different 
from a standard commercial liability policy. For example, although 
the policies clearly provide for coverage of some of the legal costs of 
defending the tax position against government challenge, sometimes 
called "contest expenses," they also state clearly that "the insurer has 
no duty to defend" the insured, which is a standard part of most 
liability insurance policies.93 Tax transaction policies are written 
exclusively on a claims-made basis; that is, they cover only losses for 
which claims are made during the policy term, which is typically three 
years - or the length of standard statute of limitations for the Service 
to issue a "notice of proposed adjustment" - but can be longer. The 
policies also contain provisions requiring the insured-taxpayer to 
notify the insurer in the event of a claim and to cooperate with the 
insurer in the event of an insured loss - all standard terms in liability 
policies. The policies typically contain subrogation clauses, which 
transfer to the insurance company the taxpayer's potential 
malpractice claim against the tax advisor who rendered an opinion for 
the tax transaction in question. 
As mentioned above, tax insurance policies are usually sold on a 
the premiums. As for the receipt of the insurance payouts in the event of an adverse 
decision by the Service, although Clark v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 33 (1939), 
nonacq. 1939-2 C.B. 45; nonacq. withdrawn and acq. , 1957-2 C.B. 3, might be cited in 
favor of exclusion, the Service would likely take the position that the payouts must be 
included. Clark involved a payment received by a taxpayer from a tax preparer to 
cover a tax liability that was, in effect, the result of the preparer's negligence; that is, 
the tax would not have been owed had the preparer not made the mistake. Tax risk 
insurance is different. With tax risk insurance, payments are made by an insurer to 
cover taxes that the taxpayer would have owed anyway. At least, that is the argument 
the Service would likely make. See, e.g. , l.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-33-007 (May 13, 
1998) (concluding that tax indemnity payments received by taxpayer from tax 
advisor's malpractice carrier must be included in gross income because 
reimbursement is for no more than the "minimum proper federal income tax liability 
based on the transaction for the tax year to which the tax reimbursement relates"). 
93 It is not entirely clear what the difference is between assuming a duty to 
defend, which is what liability policies typically do but tax insurance policies do not, 
and agreeing only to cover "contest expenses." This distinction may be an effort by 
insurers in drafting the policies to avoid state common law responsibilities that attach 
to the duty to defend. Relatedly, tax insurance policies typically give the insured 
taxpayer the right to choose the lawyer to contest the Service determination and to 
direct the case, but they impose a generally worded obligation on the insured­
taxpayer to conduct the case as if there were no insurance in place, and they require 
consultation with the insurer on settlement negotiations. 
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transaction-specific basis - that is, to cover the tax risk associated 
with a single transaction, hence the term "transactional tax risk 
insurance." Thus, such insurance is much less often sold to cover a 
corporate taxpayer's entire tax return and all of the tax risks 
contained therein, although this does happen on occasion. This is 
another difference between tax indemnity insurance and tax preparer 
warranties, which, though much more modest in the amount of 
coverage, do apply to the entire return. Most commercial liability 
insurance policies, by contrast, cover the insured for a wide range of 
risks for given period of coverage. The rationale for the transaction­
specific structure of tax insurance seems clear: to provide the insurer a 
way of limiting its exposure to particular tax positions that the insurer 
- and its tax law experts - have been able to examine, assess, 
approve, and ultimately price.94 These policies also contain a number 
of exclusions, including exclusions for fraud or for any false 
representations made by the insured to the insurer during the 
underwriting process. Premiums charged for tax insurance range 
between five and fifteen percent of the amount of the policy limits.95 
Assuming this market is reasonably competitive, we should expect 
that the premium for any given insured would approximate that 
insured's expected liability for back taxes, interest, and penalties, or 
the sum of those amounts discounted by the probability of prevailing 
on the merits, discounted further by the probability that the position 
being insured will avoid detection by the Service.96 
If tax risk insurance is primarily transactional insurance, one 
might reasonably ask what sorts of transactions are currently being 
insured. As it turns out, there is a wide range of tax situations, mostly 
- though not exclusively - involving corporations that have been the 
subject of tax risk policies, examples of which were described in Part 
1.97 One way of understanding this range of insurable tax transactions 
94 It is through this underwriting process that insurance companies can, at least 
in theory, assist in the enforcement of the tax laws. See infra Part V. 
95 Wolfe, supra note 1, at 618. 
96 In a competitive market, insurance premiums should be slightly greater than 
the expected value of total claim payouts. Because insureds are risk-averse, they will 
pay slightly more than the expected value. 
97 At the web site advertising their tax risk product, AIG lists the following 
situations as "potential opportunities for tax liability insurance": 
• Protection of the tax-free status of corporate spin-offs, split-ups or split­
offs (Section 355); 
• Tax consequences resulting from a change in ownership (for example, tax­
free mergers under Section 368); 
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is to divide them into two general categories: (1) insurance that is 
purchased to cover a taxpayer's own tax risks, and (2) insurance that is 
purchased to cover the tax risks associated with the purchase, sale, or 
exchange by the taxpayer of some entity or assets. Included in the 
first category would be the situation in which a corporation, prior to 
issuing its initial public offering of stock, decides to purchase a tax risk 
insurance policy to cover some previous transaction, on the theory 
that this move will maximize the offering price.98 The theory is that 
the capital markets need to be reassured about the tax position of the 
corporation in question. Recall, this is the risk-averse-investor story 
mentioned above.99 A different example of the first type of tax risk 
insurance is the policy that covers some tax issue that has already 
been raised by the Service, perhaps in a 30-day letter.100 What makes 
this type of insurance especially interesting is that it is a form of 
"retroactive insurance," a rare and highly specialized type of 
insurance that is, by definition, sold only after the loss event has 
occurred but while there is still substantial uncertainty as to the case's 
outcome.101 Thus, retroactive tax insurance is purchased only after the 
• Successor liability issues in the context of M&A transactions where, due to 
joint and several liability issues, an acquirer is concerned about a historic 
tax position taken by the target company or its consolidated tax group; 
• Tax liability arising from a potential loss of "S" corporation status; 
• Certain tax issues arising from Section 1031 "like-kind" exchanges; 
• Certain tax issues related to the determination of the allowable net 
operating losses in a "change of control" context (Section 382); 
• Certain tax issues arising from golden parachute payments under Section 
280G; 
• Tax liability resulting from deferred compensation arrangements that may 
be subject to challenge via the constructive receipt doctrine; 
• Tax liability arising out of an employee's use of non-recourse debt to 
finance a purchase of his employer's stock; and 
• Tax liability arising from an employee's receipt of discounted 
compensatory stock options. 
AIG Mergers & Acquisitions Ins. Group, Tax Liability Insurance Product Highlight 
Sheet, http://www.aigmergerrisks.com!files/M &A/T AX_NA_ -_Product_Highlight 
_Sheet.pd/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2005). 
98 Wolfe, supra note 1 ,  at 601-02. 
99 See discussion supra Introduction. 
100 Id. at 612. Example Four in the Introduction is based on the example in the 
Wolfe article. 
101 The most famous example of retroactive insurance was the policy purchased 
by the MGM Grand Hotel following the catastrophic fire at their facility that killed 
hundreds of people. A few months after the fire, after the company had been hit with 
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Service has told the taxpayer that it plans to challenge some issues on 
the taxpayer's return; only then does the taxpayer shift the risk of a 
tax deficiency and penalties, along with the costs of a legal defense, to 
the insurer. The premiums for retroactive insurance generally are 
relatively high, since the probability of an adverse decision is 
relatively high in comparison with that covered under a standard 
liability insurance policy, where the loss event has not yet occurred.102 
The same could be said of retroactive tax risk insurance. Retroactive 
tax insurance is also more expensive than regular tax insurance 
because with regular tax risk insurance the probability that the issue 
being insured will be detected is less than one, whereas with 
retroactive tax insurance the probability of detection is one. 
As for the second general category of tax risk insurance, 
quintessential tax transaction insurance, there are numerous 
examples, many of which involve transactions that seek to gain the 
benefit of either tax deferral through the application of specific 
nonrecognition provisions or the avoidance of multiple layers of tax. 
The first three examples in the Introduction would fit into this 
category. In Example One, the taxpayer, an individual, is interested 
in investing in an existing partnership, but her research reveals that 
the partnership in question has a potential tax issue.103 The taxpayer 
could purchase a tax insurance policy to cover this risk. In Example 
Three, the taxpayer is a corporation that wants to purchase a 
subsidiary of a nearly insolvent parent company. When the taxpayer 
discovers that the subsidiary has a potential tax issue, it worries that 
there may be some successor tax liability in the event the case goes 
badly, and it is concerned that the parent corporation might not have 
sufficient assets, or might not even be around, to cover the potential 
tax liability associated with the target company's prior actions. In that 
situation, the purchasing company might decide to buy a tax 
indemnity policy to shift all or some of the tax risk to an insurer, 
rather than bear the risk itself. Numerous other examples include a 
whole range of tax-related issues, many of which involve the 
application of anti-avoidance standards to transactions whose 
structure is at least partially influenced by tax considerations. 
over 450 lawsuits but when the size of the ultimate liability was still greatly in 
question, the owners of the property purchased a retroactive liability policy to cover 
the loss. See David Lauter, MGM Cases Still Smoldering; Settlement Fund Reaches 
$140M; Hotel Battles Insurers, NAT'L L.J., May 23, 1983, at 7. 
102 MGM Grand paid $39 million in premiums for $170 million in retroactive 
coverage. Id. 
103 Wolfe, supra note 1, at 614-15. 
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Probably the most highly publicized use of a tax insurance policy 
to date involved a transaction similar to the one described in Example 
Two in the Introduction. In 2001,  the Georgia Pacific Company 
wanted to split off its timber operations in a transaction that would 
qualify for nontaxation under Code section 355. In the split-off 
transaction, Georgia Pacific in effect planned to distribute its stock in 
a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation which had substantially 
appreciated in value to Georgia Pacific's shareholders, in exchange for 
those shareholders' shares in Georgia Pacific. Without section 355, 
such a transaction would produce two levels of income tax: (1) tax at 
the corporate level to Georgia Pacific on what is effectively a sale of 
its subsidiary to its shareholders, and (2) a tax to the shareholders on 
the distribution of the shares in the subsidiary. Given the amount of 
appreciation that can be present in such a subsidiary, the resulting tax 
liability can be huge and would have been so in this case, large enough 
in fact to make the transaction not worth doing. Under section 355, 
however, if certain requirements are met, such split-off transactions 
can be treated as a nontaxable event. The problem is that one of the 
requirements is that the split-off be primarily motivated by a 
substantial nontax "business purpose" and cannot be merely a 
"device" for avoiding tax through a disguised dividend. The answer to 
the business purpose question, however, requires a very fact-intensive, 
ex post, standard-like inquiry. Although the Service had for years 
provided such rulings in section 355 cases, in the Georgia Pacific case 
the Service declined to do so, citing the heavily fact-intensive nature 
of the inquiry. As a result, the parties to the transaction faced a large 
amount of unanticipated tax-related legal uncertainty with respect to 
the transaction. In response, Georgia Pacific opted to purchase a tax 
insurance policy, with a policy limit of $500 million, to cover the 
possible corporate level tax. With the insurance in place, the deal 
then went through. After this highly-publicized transaction, the 
Service announced that it would no longer provide advance rulings on 
the business purpose part of proposed section 355 transactions.104 The 
Service stated that the issue was too fact-intensive and that, like other 
such fact-intensive issues, would henceforth be resolved only on 
examination. Thus, for section 355-related and many other types of 
transactions, corporate taxpayers are left with the choice of forgoing 
the transactions, going ahead with the transaction and bearing the risk 
itself, or purchasing a tax indemnity policy. These are among the 
costs of tax law uncertainty. 
104 Rev. Proc. 2003-48, 2003-29 1.R.B. 86. 
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B. The Function of Tax Insurance 
This brings us to the asserted function and alleged social benefit 
of tax risk insurance. Perhaps the best statement of the case is found 
in the comments submitted by an official at The Hartford Insurance 
Company in a written statement on proposed Treasury Regulations 
that would have required any taxpayer purchasing a tax insurance 
policy to treat the insured transaction as a "reportable transaction" 
under Code section 6011 .  The statement bears quoting at length: 
Tax insurance provides a needed alternative to the expenses, 
limitations and uncertainties associated with private letter 
ruling requests. Purchasers of tax insurance tend to be 
conservative, highly risk-averse taxpayers (or their lenders or 
investors) who choose to reduce or transfer even a modicum 
of tax risk identified in their transactions in order to increase 
certainty. Tax insurance was created due to a market need 
for a financial product to facilitate extraordinary transactions 
that may not otherwise close within the desired time frame 
because of the uncertainty with respect to a tax issue. For 
example, an auction bid typically cannot be contingent upon 
or delayed until the receipt of a satisfactory private letter 
ruling or pre-filing agreement. 
Tax insurance is underwritten by or with the support of tax 
attorneys who carefully review a transaction to "weed out" 
weak tax positions and insure strong tax positions. In stark 
contrast to certain tax practitioners (and promoters) who 
generate fees by creative application of the Tax Code, tax 
insurance underwriters are "rewarded" for providing a 
conservative, prudent analysis of a proposed tax position. 
Thus, tax insurance fills the "gap" caused by the cost, 
limitations, uncertainties and delays associated with private 
letter rulings . . . .  Tax insurance allows customary commercial 
transactions (albeit complex transactions) to proceed timely 
and with certainty of the tax consequences. Most 
importantly, by refusing to insure tax shelters, abusive 
schemes and weakly supported tax positions, the tax 
insurance industry injects a distinctly conservative evaluation 
within the community of tax professionals and helps to 
cultivate a culture of compliance in which corporate tax 
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shelters are less often created.105 
These statements were intended to ward off government 
intervention in the tax insurance market and must therefore be taken 
with a grain of salt. But they also contain the basis of what turns out 
to be a pretty solid case in favor of allowing, and perhaps even 
encouraging, the purchase of tax risk insurance. The argument goes 
something like this: Notwithstanding the rule-based nature of the tax 
laws, there remains significant legal uncertainty in how the tax laws 
will be applied to many types of transactions. This uncertainty can 
inhibit various types of transactions or can result in unfair and costly 
risk-bearing, especially when taxpayers are for whatever reason highly 
risk-averse with respect to tax deficiencies or tax penalties. For many 
years, the normal source of tax law risk insurance has been the private 
letter ruling issued by the Service with respect to particular 
transactions. For whatever reasons, the Service is not able or willing 
to provide rulings in a timely fashion for many types of tax law risks, 
especially those that involve fact-intensive standard-like inquiries.106 
Insurance companies can fill this gap. Moreover, because insurance 
companies have the resources to hire the very best tax lawyers in the 
world to assist in the underwriting process, they can do a better job of 
screening these transactions for excessively aggressive positions than 
the Service can. If all of this is true, we have the makings of a case for 
allowing or even encouraging the purchase tax risk insurance. So 
what's the catch? The next section explores the main concerns with 
tax risk insurance: the specter of tax shelter insurance. 
C. The Concern About Tax Shelter Insurance: Deterrence Undermined 
The problem with tax risk insurance is that it might be used to 
insure, and thereby to encourage, overly aggressive tax positions. To 
see this point, refer back to the tax-compliance continuum in Part IL 
This continuum illustrates conceptually the range of possible tax 
transactions for which an individual or corporate taxpayer might seek 
to purchase tax risk insurance. On the far right, to the right of Point 
B, there is no legal uncertainty. The taxpayer knows that it is entitled 
105 See Insurance Group Comments, supra note 9. 
106 The Service has a longstanding written policy of not issuing private letter 
rulings for such fact intensive questions. For a complete and recent list of the areas in 
which the Service states that it will not issue an advance ruling, see Rev. Proc. 2005-3, 
2005-1 I.RB. 118 (covering domestic tax issues), and Rev. Proc. 2005-7, 2005-1 I.RB. 
240 (covering international tax issues). 
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to the tax treatment in question, and there is no need for private 
insurance or a private letter ruling. On the far left, to the left of Point 
A, are transactions that amount to outright tax evasion where the 
taxpayer knows that the position being taken is illegal. For those 
transactions, too, there is complete legal certainty, since the illegality 
of the position is clear; there is only detection uncertainty -
uncertainty as to whether or not the position will be caught by the 
Service. Although such transactions or such misuses of the tax code 
are the most undesirable of all from a social perspective (hence the 
criminal penalties) ,  they are almost entirely irrelevant to the 
discussion of tax risk insurance, as there is virtually no possibility that 
any insurance company would ever insure such a transaction. Indeed, 
every tax risk insurance policy that I have seen has contained an 
exclusion for tax evasion. And although the policies do not provide a 
comprehensive definition of the term "evasion," there is no doubt that 
cases involving criminal penalties would be excluded. There is also 
usually a separate exclusion for fraud, which would presumably 
exclude coverage for tax cases involving civil fraud penalties. What is 
even more important, no insurer would ever sell a policy without such 
an exclusion. The reasons are simple. First, an insurance policy sold 
to cover intentional wrongdoing would almost certainly be considered 
unenforceable.107 Second, the insurance company itself might be or 
become subject to separate penalties for in effect aiding and abetting a 
criminal activity. Third, and perhaps most important, no insurance 
company would be willing to risk the bad publicity that insuring tax 
evasion would bring. In sum, there is no serious concern that insurers 
would ever sell what would be considered pure detection risk 
insurance. 
The problem is the range of tax positions represented by the 
middle section of the tax compliance continuum between Points A 
and B, with the most problematic area clustering around Point C. 
More precisely, the real concern, from a tax enforcement perspective, 
lies to the left (on the evasion side) of Point C. The reason Point C is 
so important is that infinitesimally to the right of it is the important 
more-likely-than-not threshold, the standard that must be satisfied in 
107 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, 8 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 19:20 (4th ed. 1998) ("It seems quite clear that the doctrine that 
agreements to indemnify against negligence are valid should not be extended to 
intentional misconduct or willful wrongdoing involving personal volition, such as, for 
example, child molestation, or other intentional and inherently harmful activity.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
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order to acquire in effect an exemption from tax shelter penalties.108 
That is, if a tax advisor provides an opinion that characterizes the 
taxpayer's position as being more likely than not to prevail on the 
merits if examined, the odds are very good that no penalties will 
ensue. More aggressive taxpayers and more aggressive tax advisors 
may attempt to defend positions that are in some objective sense to 
the left of Point C, on the belief that they can convince a judge, who is 
often not a tax expert, that the more-likely-than-not threshold had 
been met. Indeed, when we factor in the low probability of detection, 
the relatively low penalties for tax understatements, the increased 
market pressure on corporations to cut tax payments, and the general 
sentiment that structuring one's affairs to minimize taxes is a public 
right, the incentive for sophisticated taxpayers to push to the left of 
Point B becomes very strong indeed. Moreover, for transactions that 
do not qualify as tax shelters as defined by the Code, the relevant 
standard is to the left of C, since avoidance of penalties for substantial 
tax understatements for nonshelters requires only "substantial 
authority," which is something less than a fifty-plus percent chance of 
prevailing on the merits. Because of this lower standard, taxpayers 
presumably have an incentive to claim that their transactions are not 
shelters - that they do not have a "significant purpose" of avoiding 
or evading federal taxation - although for the most egregious 
shelters this strategy would be risky. Still, this phenomenon may tend 
to push some taxpayers to take positions even further to the left of 
Point C. For all of these reasons, an argument can be made that more 
and more taxpayers are choosing to take tax positions that lie to the 
left of Point C and closer to what might rightly be called tax evasion, 
where there is little substantive legal uncertainty (i.e. ,  the positions 
will almost certainly be shot down if detected), and the only 
uncertainty is whether the taxpayers will be caught. Indeed, this is 
one way of restating the tax shelter phenomenon. 
Now introduce tax risk insurance into the picture. It is one thing 
to allow taxpayers to insure substantive legal uncertainty, when it is 
anyone's guess how the law will be applied to a given transaction. But 
it is quite another to allow them to insure pure detection risk, when 
the position is probably illegal, in the sense that a court would likely 
reject it as being inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the 
Code, and the only uncertainty is whether the Service will catch them. 
If tax indemnity insurance was allowed for highly aggressive tax 
shelters, and Congress and Treasury did nothing about it, the 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39. 
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deterrence consequences could be profound. Those taxpayers who 
were considering whether or not to engage in an aggressive shelter but 
who were marginally deterred by the risk of tax penalties might be 
induced by the presence of tax shelter insurance to take the plunge. 
Or those already inclined to engage in such transactions may decide to 
increase the scope or aggressiveness of the shelter transactions, if part 
of the risk could be shifted to a third-party insurers. It is unrealistic, 
of course, to assume that lawmakers would not respond to this 
possibility. Thus, if tax shelter insurance began to be sold, lawmakers 
might simply increase dramatically the financial penalties for "abusive 
tax shelters," which would presumably be reflected in tax insurance 
premiums, thus maintaining the deterrence effect that existed without 
the insurance. The main problem with that approach, besides the 
apparent political difficulty Congress experiences in raising tax 
compliance penalties generally, is that even if it adopted higher shelter 
penalties, they might be considered unfairly punitive for uninsured 
taxpayers. That problem could be addressed in tum by imposing 
special, higher penalties for those with shelter insurance, but then we 
have gone a considerable way toward banning the practice altogether. 
Alternatively, or in addition, the Treasury Department might shift 
away from using financial penalties, which would increasingly be 
insured, and toward uninsurable nonmonetary sanctions such as stiffer 
jail sentences. The problem with that response, however, is that jail­
time may not always be a good substitute for monetary penalties, and 
the use of nonmonetary sanctions may also suffer from 
proportionality problems. The upshot of all of this is that, in a world 
with tax shelter insurance, it is certainly possible that the deterrence 
value of monetary penalties would be reduced and that, as a result, 
shelter activity would increase. 
In fact, for all of these reasons, everyone seems to agree that the 
sale of tax shelter insurance would be a bad thing. Even those who 
sell or promote tax insurance policies agree with that conclusion. 
Moreover, if tax insurance policies were currently being sold to cover 
pure detection risk, the risk created by the most egregious and 
indefensible shelter transactions, everyone would agree that some 
measure of regulatory intervention by the government would be 
warranted. How likely is it, however, that insurers would ever sell tax 
shelter coverage? We have already noted that they would never sell 
tax-evasion insurance, as it would be unenforceable and risky. What 
about tax shelters, however? In their promotional materials, tax 
insurers state emphatically that they do not insure tax shelters, which 
at least one such insurer defines in its promotional materials as 
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transactions "for the principal purpose of obtaining a tax advantage." 
These statements could be pure propaganda disseminated for the 
benefit of tax and insurance regulators. Moreover, there is 
considerable wiggle room in the term "principal purpose." However, 
the policies that I have seen do not cover tax transactions that fit the 
mold of the quintessentially abusive corporate tax shelter of the sort 
that has received attention recently in the tax and general business 
press and that has led to a regulatory crackdown. To the contrary, 
with the transactions that are currently being insured, although there 
is obviously an element of merits risk or legal uncertainty that could 
be a substantial concern for risk-averse taxpayers, the probability of 
winning on the merits is not so low as to call into question the good 
faith of the taxpayers. For example, consider. the run-of-the-mill 
section 355 split-off transaction, similar to the one described above. 
Although there is clearly some risk that such a transaction could be 
disallowed by the Service under an existing anti-avoidance principle 
- such as the business purpose requirement - even the tax shelter 
police would have to admit that such cases present genuine legal 
uncertainty or significant merits risk. Moreover, because such 
transactions are identified on the taxpayers' returns and are generally 
well publicized within financial circles, the detection risk for such 
transactions is quite high. The same could be said of many of the 
corporate reorganization transactions, such as those under Code 
section 368, that have become the bread and butter work of corporate 
tax lawyers and that despite presenting some prospect of disallowance 
- indeed, if there were no such prospect, the tax lawyers would not 
be needed - are not particularly aggressive tax plays. These 
transactions too are now being insured. Moreover, there are many 
other routine corporate acquisition and merger transactions being 
insured that do not involve the sorts of transactions that are of 
greatest concern to the Treasury Department. Certainly none of the 
examples of transactions that have been reported as being insured are 
transactions, or are substantially similar to those transactions, that 
appear on the Service's official list of targeted shelter transactions.109 
In addition, as discussed above, at least some of the tax risk policies 
seem to involve virtually no uncertainty as to detection, and thus only 
merits risk or substantive legal uncertainty, as the insurance is 
purchased after a ruling request has been submitted to the Service, 
109 The Service's most recent list of abusive tax shelters and transactions can be 
found online at Internal Revenue Service, Listed Abusive Tax Shelters and 
Transactions, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/O,,id=120633,00.html 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2005) . 
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and hence after the probability of detection on audit has been 
increased to one. 
Even if many of the tax transaction insurance policies written 
today cover legitimate substantive legal uncertainty - and these are 
the policies that insurers advertise to the public - it is possible that 
insurance policies covering more aggressive tax positions are being 
sold in secret, perhaps protected by confidentiality agreements. 
Alternatively, even if tax shelter insurance policies are not currently 
being offered, over time the competitive pressure could lead more 
aggressive insurers to begin covering more aggressive tax positions. 
So, what should be done about it? Should we ban such policies? That 
would throw the baby out with the bath water, since over-compliance 
with the tax laws as a result of substantive legal uncertainty can in 
theory be as much a source of wasteful distortion and unfair allocation 
as can under-compliance. Should we instead regulate privately 
provided tax risk insurance? Alternatively, should we expand the 
circumstances under which the Service will provide private letter 
rulings, thereby eliminating the need and the demand for private tax 
risk insurance? The next Part considers these and related questions. 
V. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO TAX RISK INSURANCE 
A. Compulsory Disclosure, Ex Post Penalties, and the Contrast with 
Tax Advisor Warranties 
If regulators are concerned about tax transaction insurance 
morphing into tax shelter insurance, perhaps the simplest and most 
obvious regulatory solution would be compulsory disclosure, to 
require taxpayers who purchase tax indemnity insurance to disclose 
this fact to the Service, perhaps by attaching a copy of the insurance 
policy to their tax returns. Such a requirement (a) would reduce the 
possibility that the insurance was being sold for aggressive tax shelter 
positions - that is, being sold to cover pure detection risk, and (b) 
would allow the use of such policies to cover legitimate legal 
uncertainty. The benefit of including the policy with the tax return is 
that the policies themselves typically contain a detailed description of 
the tax position being insured. Indeed, such a detailed description is 
essential to the insurer's ability to underwrite the policy, because the 
insurer must carefully circumscribe the nature of the transaction it is 
covering in order to minimize moral hazard on the part of the 
taxpayer - which here would mean the taxpayer is taking a more 
aggressive position than the insurer agreed to cover. Hence, the 
policy itself must spell out the precise nature of the transaction being 
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insured. If the policy is then attached to the taxpayer's return and the 
Service, upon reviewing the policy, determined that the return in 
question - especially the insured tax position - warranted auditing, 
they could do so. Compulsory disclosure therefore would largely 
eliminate the possibility that tax insurance would be sold for pure 
detection risk. 
Interestingly, the compulsory disclosure idea was recently 
considered by the Treasury Department and was even included in one 
version of the Treasury Department's temporary regulations 
governing so-called "reportable" transactions. Under those 
temporary regulations, the purchase of tax indemnity insurance was to 
trigger a filing requirement, although not a requirement to attach the 
policy. Rather, the taxpayer who purchased a tax insurance policy 
would have been required to file the standard "Disclosure Statement 
for Reportable Transaction" used for all reportable transactions.110 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the insurance industry objected to the 
proposal, arguing that this reporting requirement would have a 
"chilling effect" on the tax insurance industry and thereby harm the 
economy, as on their view tax insurance was becoming a useful 
substitute for advance letter rulings and was thus important to 
continued mergers and acquisitions activity.111 They argued further 
that tax insurance was not being sold for shelter transactions, was only 
being sold to taxpayers who were concerned about substantive legal 
uncertainty, and had the effect of improving tax compliance because 
only the most conservative tax positions would survive the insurers' 
underwriting processes. 
Although these arguments are obviously self-serving, they do 
have some merit, as I will explain. For now, it is worth noting that 
part of the risk currently being insured under tax risk policies is audit 
risk or detection risk. That is to say, when insurers currently sell tax 
risk insurance, they almost certainly price their policies to account for 
the possibility that the tax issue being insured will never be detected 
110 See Temp. Treas. Reg. § l .6011-4T(b)(4) (2000). 
111 In particular, Dave De Berry of The Hartford testified as follows: 
The Hartford, together with all other carriers that provide tax insurance, 
opposes the proliferation of corporate tax shelters and abusive tax 
avoidance schemes. Sound underwriting practices by insurance carriers and 
their respective reinsurance carriers precludes coverage for tax shelters or 
abusive tax avoidance schemes, as well as legitimate positions that seem to 
be only weakly supported by the facts . . . .  
Insurance Group Comments, supra note 9, CJ[ 9. 
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by the Service. They would be crazy not to do so, given the 
competitive nature of the insurance business. If an insurer considered 
only merits risk and in effect assumed that the issue being insured 
would be litigated, the premium the insurer would have to charge 
would be high - perhaps very high - relative to the premium that 
could be charged if detection risk (i.e. ,  the possibility of avoiding 
detection) were factored in. Therefore, any insurer that ignored the 
possibility that the issue would go undetected would lose out in the 
competition for insureds, as another insurer could easily come along 
and under-price the first insurer for essentially the same product. 
Knowing this fact, insurers will be induced by competition to factor 
the chance of avoiding detection into their premiums. This conclusion 
assumes, however, that the Service does not require the policies to be 
disclosed when the return is filed. If disclosure is required, premiums 
would have to rise to reflect the . increased probability of detection. 
The higher premiums would presumably deter some taxpayers from 
purchasing a tax insurance policy in the first place. This sort of direct 
chilling effect, however, is entirely for the good. Put differently, the 
chilling effect associated with increased prices due to increased 
probability of detection would deter precisely the types of tax 
insurance transactions that are of greatest concern. If after the 
adoption of a reporting requirement the tax insurance market were to 
dry up completely as a result of this effect, and insurers and taxpayers 
were not able to negotiate policies in ways that made them profitable 
for both sides, such an outcome would provide fairly convincing 
evidence that these products are providing more coverage for 
detection uncertainty than substantive legal uncertainty and are 
probably best eliminated.112 
This is not to say, however, that the chilling effect argument is 
wholly without merit. Compulsory disclosure may raise the cost of tax 
risk insurance even for those policies covering primarily substantive 
legal risk. This could happen, for example, if the taxpayer's disclosure 
of a tax insurance policy were to trigger or significantly increase the 
likelihood of triggering an audit by the Service of the taxpayer's entire 
return and not merely the single transaction being insured. Imagine 
that the Service were of the view that taxpayers who purchase tax 
insurance tended on average to be more aggressive on their returns 
112 Indeed, some skeptics have suggested to me that there really is very little 
substantive legal uncertainty involved in the types of tax planning transactions that 
are currently being insured, thus implying that what is being insured is primarily 
detection risk. If that is so, then a disclosure requirement will likely cause the market 
for such insurance to disappear. 
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generally. If so, the Service might treat tax insurance as a proxy for 
overall aggressiveness and subject such taxpayers to increased scrutiny 
across the board. Were that to happen, it would be akin to placing an 
excise tax on the purchase of tax insurance, but worse - since it 
would be an uncertain tax, inasmuch as the likely outcome and cost of 
such increased scrutiny would be uncertain. The result at the margins 
would be that some taxpayers would be priced out of the market, and, 
at the extreme, the market for tax insurance might collapse entirely. 
What is more, even if the Service were to limit its increased scrutiny to 
the specific transactions being insured, on the speculation that those 
are likely to involve aggressive tax positions, that too would raise the 
cost of tax insurance and perhaps inhibit the market's development. 
Assuming the Service is wrong that the purchase of tax insurance 
indicates a greater propensity for tax aggressiveness and wrong that 
the transactions being insured are themselves especially aggressive, 
this would be a bad result: a social-welfare-enhancing product would 
be forced off the market. This might be thought of as an indirect 
chilling effect of a compulsory disclosure requirement. How likely is 
it to happen? If tax insurance companies behave as they claim to, 
engaging in careful underwriting to make sure that the only tax 
positions they insure are ones that have a strong likelihood of 
succeeding on the merits, then the purchase of tax insurance need not 
signal hyper-aggressiveness in any respect. To the contrary, it may 
develop into a signal of tax-planning conservatism if some insurers 
over time can establish a reputation for only insuring fairly 
conservative positions. The real chilling effect problem, however, 
occurs in the short run, before the insurers have had a chance to prove 
themselves and when the Service may well be tempted justifiably to 
increase audit rates of insured returns, at least for a while. A possible 
solution to this problem would be to provide a modest and perhaps 
temporary subsidy to defray the extra costs of purchasing tax 
insurance caused by increased audit rates. 
Compulsory reporting of tax transaction insurance raises other 
issues as well. For example, without stiff penalties for nonreporting, 
the incentive to report may be too low. Of course, if failure to report 
a tax insurance contract were made punishable by a criminal or stiff 
civil penalty, this problem could be substantially reduced. The other 
problem with the reporting solution is that, when a category of 
transactions is required to be reported in this way, taxpayers can 
sometimes construe the requirement so broadly, sometimes 
intentionally, as to deluge the Service with an avalanche of paper. 
That is, there could be such a large increase in information being 
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reported that the Service would be overwhelmed and could not 
separate the wheat from the chaff. If that were to happen, then the 
reporting response would not be helpful. Although the information 
avalanche scenario seems highly unlikely at present, given the small 
size of the tax risk insurance market, if the use of these policies were 
to expand considerably, the problem could be significant. The 
problem is not just that the Service may be overwhelmed, but also that 
the administrative reporting costs imposed on taxpayers would be 
increased. An alternative to compulsory reporting would be to do 
nothing for now and to wait and see what happens, which seems to be 
the path chosen by the government. If it turns out that some 
insurance companies are writing policies for highly or even marginally 
aggressive positions, action could be taken against that particular 
insurer and its clients. Penalties could be imposed on insurers who are 
found to have sold insurance for tax shelter positions. Those insurers 
could be required to disclose their clients to the Service, who would 
then be subject to a new and especially searching audit process and 
ultimately increased penalties as well. Also, if the Treasury 
Department determines that some categories of overly aggressive 
positions are being insured, a list of "uninsurable positions" could be 
promulgated, akin to the "listed transactions" category, positions that 
if insured would give rise to a special penalty for taxpayers and 
insurers alike. This approach would have the benefit of deterring tax 
shelter insurance without subjecting the policies covering true 
substantive legal uncertainty to any special penalties. Of course, with 
this approach, and especially without compulsory disclosure, there 
would always be the possibility that the aggressive taxpayer-insurer 
collaborations might escape detection. But that is the sort of 
possibility that again can be handled by increasing penalties ex post. 
To date, the insurance industry has persuaded the Treasury 
Department that tax insurance is not a problem that warrants 
regulatory intervention. Thus, under the current reportable­
transaction regulations, the purchase of tax insurance does not trigger 
a reporting requirement; there are no special penalties for tax insurers 
who insure tax shelter transactions.113 It is interesting to note, 
however, that other forms of "contractual protection" - such as 
money-back warranties provided by tax advisors - do trigger the 
reporting requirement. Thus, as discussed at the end of Part III 
above, if the insurance is provided by the tax advisor rather than by a 
separate insurance company and if the insurance is limited to a refund 
113 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (2004). 
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of fees in the event that the tax position in question is rejected, then 
the taxpayer must flag the transaction for the Service.1 14 The 
exception to this rule is when the tax advice being given, and the 
money-back guarantee being provided, involves a claim for refund 
based on a return that was already filed prior to any fees being 
charged. Obviously, then, the concern here is that such guarantees or 
contingent fee arrangements will be used to cover mostly detection 
risk (i.e., aggressive shelter opinions), except in cases involving refund 
claims, where the probability of detection is significantly greater, 
though not necessarily equal to one. The interesting question is why 
this concern about detection risk or shelter insurance would be 
greater for tax advisor warranties and contingent fee arrangements 
than for tax insurance policies. The answer to this question might 
shed some light on what, if anything, should be done about tax 
transaction insurance. 
The main differences between tax transaction insurance and tax 
advisor warranties are the involvement of insurance companies and 
the concomitant triggering of the states' insurance regulatory regimes. 
Insurance companies are notoriously conservative in their 
underwriting practices and must satisfy various regulatory reporting 
requirements that tax advisors need not satisfy. Moreover, whereas 
tax advisor warranties, which are generally oral and informal in 
nature, probably are not subject to the sort of public policy 
restrictions that would apply to formal, written insurance policies. 
Hence, one external regulatory force that would inhibit both the 
demand for and the supply of insurance policies for increasingly 
aggressive tax plays would be the possibility that such contracts might 
be deemed void as against public policy. Although it seems 
unthinkable that an insurance company would invoke this doctrine to 
avoid paying under such a policy, it is possible that an aggressive state 
regulator, insurance commissioner, or attorney general might make 
such a ruling. In addition, from what I am told, current demand for 
tax transaction insurance is being met by only a small number of large 
insurance companies. Given this fact, if a particular insurer decided to 
offer policies for aggressive tax shelter transactions and this were 
discovered, the Treasury Department could then take action against 
the aggressive insurer, in much the same way that it has already done 
with tax shelter promoters. The threat of such a possibility likely 
would deter insurers from overstepping the line. By contrast, in the 
absence of an official reporting requirement for other types of 
114 See supra note 87. 
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contractual protection, presumably including tax advisor warranties, it 
seems unlikely that they would ever be discovered or made public. 
One can certainly imagine some especially aggressive tax advisors 
being willing to play the audit lottery along with their clients, whereas 
that possibility seems rather unlikely with insurance companies. 
What is my bottom line? Is current Treasury policy fine as it is, or 
should more be done to reduce the risk of tax shelter insurance? It is 
difficult to offer a definitive answer to these questions, given that the 
dangers that tax insurance presents, if any, depend on the larger 
context of tax enforcement policy. Thus, if tax shelter activity was 
already adequately deterred by a combination of aggressive Service 
auditing and stiff penalties for tax underpayments - and I mean 
much stiffer than is currently the case - tax insurance policies as well 
as tax advisor warranties would likely be a nonissue. Either the 
detection risk would be high, meaning the insurance would cover only 
substantive legal uncertainty, or the penalties would be so high that 
the result would be the same. In the current regulatory climate, 
however, a climate in which audit rates are low, the Service staff is 
outgunned by highly paid tax advisors, and tax penalties are far below 
levels necessary to achieve optimal deterrence, some modest 
regulatory action would seem appropriate. Thus, the compulsory 
disclosure option mentioned above strikes me as a sensible step. 
Although the distinction the Treasury has drawn between private 
contractual-protection agreements and insurance policies is 
defensible, I am unpersuaded. That is, I would probably require 
taxpayers to disclose their purchase of tax insurance in the manner 
described above, although I would try to find some way to offset the 
cost of this disclosure in order to minimize the indirect chilling effect. 
Given the nature of the tax transaction policies currently being sold, it 
is highly doubtful that the market would be much affected by a 
disclosure requirement. Indeed, it could even be helped, as the public 
and the Service would be made aware of the nature of the policies and 
the types of transactions being insured. Furthermore, because of this 
publicity effect, it is conceivable that compulsory disclosure could 
ultimately lead to more corporate and wealthy individual taxpayers 
trying it. Assuming the Service has the resources to review all of these 
insurance policies and the transactions being insured by them, the 
spread of tax risk insurance would not necessarily be a bad outcome. 
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B. Private Versus Public Insurance for Tax Law Uncertainty 
Before we can conclude definitively that a private market in tax 
risk insurance is a good thing, however, we must return to the 
comparison between private tax insurance and its most obvious 
alternative, government provided tax law uncertainty insurance. 
Given the reasonable assumption that Congress cannot possibly enact 
tax laws that cover every conceivable transaction in advance, there 
will always be some residual substantive tax law uncertainty. The 
primary means in the past of dealing with this uncertainty for risk­
averse taxpayers has always been the private letter ruling. In general, 
if a taxpayer follows certain technical filing procedures, the Service 
will issue a ruling directly to the taxpayer that explains how it will 
apply the law to the particular transaction described in the ruling 
request.115 The Service will issue rulings on both proposed and 
completed transactions, assuming no return has yet been filed and the 
ruling-request procedures have been followed.116 If a favorable ruling 
is issued by the Service, the taxpayer may generally rely upon it. 1 17 In 
that sense, then, a favorable letter ruling is akin to purchasing tax law 
uncertainty insurance from the government. Private letter rulings can 
be revoked retroactively under certain conditions, which also is 
similar to an insurance policy that can be rendered void if certain 
exclusions are triggered. For example, this could occur if the Service 
determines that the taxpayer misstated an important fact in its ruling 
request or determines that the factual circumstance of the transaction 
has changed dramatically from the facts that prevailed at the time of 
the request. That possibility is analogous to the exclusion in most 
insurance policies that eliminates coverage if the insured commits 
fraud or makes any materially misleading statement in the insurance 
application process. Private letter rulings can also be revoked by the 
issuance of a revenue ruling, the promulgation of final regulations, the 
enactment of federal legislation, or a decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court that is directly on point.1 18 This possibility is akin to the 
115 The procedures for filing a ruling request are contained and updated in the 
first revenue procedure issued by the Service each year. See, e.g. , Rev. Proc. 2005-1, 
2005-1 l.R.B. 1. 
116 See id. § 5.01. 
117 See id. § 11 .  Private letter rulings have no precedential value for other 
taxpayers. Taxpayers, however, will sometimes look to them as evidence of how the 
Service might handle particular issues that have not yet been addressed in more 
formal announcements, such as in a Revenue Ruling. 
11s Id. 
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exclusion in tax risk insurance policies for changes in the law. If the 
taxpayer seeking a letter ruling wants even greater certainty from the 
government regarding the tax treatment of a particular transaction, he 
or she can enter into a "closing agreement" with the Service, which 
conclusively determines the issue in question and is binding on the 
Service unless there is fraud or material misstatement on the part of 
the taxpayer.119 The additional level of "coverage" provided by the 
closing agreement effectively eliminates the risk of retroactive 
revocation by revenue ruling, regulation, or congressional action, 
although the fraud and misrepresentation limitations remain. Of 
course, the Service does not charge a premium for this insurance in 
the same way that an insurance company does. It charges a nominal 
fee, and the taxpayer must incur the cost of hiring a lawyer to draft the 
ruling request, but the taxpayer is not required to make a payment to 
the government that approximates the expected value of the 
taxpayer's tax liability, as there is with private tax risk insurance. 
An important question is why the private-letter-ruling process is 
not itself sufficient to meet taxpayers' need for tax law uncertainty 
insurance. If taxpayers are so concerned about the uncertainty of how 
the tax laws will be applied, why do they not simply apply for a ruling? 
This is what is done in other areas of law.120 As already noted, there 
are a number of circumstances in which the Service will not issue 
119 Id. § 2.02. 
120 In other areas of law where there is similar transaction-specific or activity­
specific legal uncertainty, individuals or corporations that are concerned about such 
uncertainty can request that the regulators render an opinion as to how the law would 
apply to a particular set of facts. For example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) upon request will issue so-called no action letters indicating that 
no criminal or civil action will be taken against the person engaged in a particular 
activity. The letters, typically issued from a particular division within the SEC, 
usually state that the division "will not recommend enforcement action," with the 
following qualification: 
This position is based on the representations made to the Division in your 
letter. Any different facts or conditions might require the Division to reach 
a different conclusion. Further, this response only represents the Division's 
position on enforcement and does not purport to express any legal 
conclusion on the question presented. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, No Action, Interpretive and/or Exemptive Letter: Insilco 
Holding Co., http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/insilco031803.htm (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2005) ; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Staff No Action, Interpretive 
and Exemptive Letters, http://www.sec.gov/interps/noaction.shtml (last visited Sept. 
17, 2005). 
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l. 121 d ru mgs. Among them are whether a propose or completed 
transaction "lack[s] a bona fide business purpose" or has as its 
"principal purpose the reduction of federal taxes." In addition, the 
Service states that it will not "ordinarily" issue rulings (a) on " [a]ny 
matter in which the determination requested is primarily one of 
fact . . .  [such as] whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated 
as stock or indebtedness," (b) in "[ s ]ituations where the requested 
ruling deals with only part of an integrated transaction," and (c) on 
issues that are "under [extensive] study" by the Service.122 
Unfortunately, these are categories that could be construed to cover 
many transactions, and they are types of transactions that often 
involve the highest degree of legal uncertainty. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, then, they are transactions for which private insurance 
has recently become available. The question now becomes why the 
Service is not willing to provide rulings under circumstances of 
profound substantive legal uncertainty - such as ones that involve 
the application of anti-avoidance standards - and why private 
insurers are willing to insure such transactions. As it turns out, there 
are a number of possible explanations.123 
Continuing the insurance analogy, one conceivable answer is that 
the Service simply does not have the resources to "underwrite" the 
risks. That is, they do not have a large enough or sufficiently capable 
staff to do the factual and legal analysis necessary to issue rulings on 
such fact-intensive questions without running a big risk of adverse 
selection and moral hazard.124 That is, if the Service were to issue 
rulings on such questions as whether there is a sufficient nontax 
business purpose in a particular transaction, or whether there was 
economic substance without having done a thorough and detailed 
analysis of all the relevant facts and law, there would be a tendency 
for relatively aggressive taxpayers to apply for such rulings. 
Moreover, because once a ruling is issued it is difficult for the Service 
to determine if it should be retroactively revoked - for example, 
because the actual transaction does not coincide with the described 
transaction - taxpayers who have secured an advance ruling have an 
121 See Rev. Proc. 2005-3, 2005-1 I.RB. 118. The list of issues on which the 
Service will never or will not "ordinarily" give letter rulings is updated in the third 
revenue procedure of each year. 
122 Id. 
123 I do not know if there is a similar list of issues about which the SEC will not 
issue no action letters. 
124 Underwriting is the process by which insurers determine whether a particular 
risk is insurable and, if so, under what contractual terms. 
410 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 25:339 
incentive subtly to alter the transactions so as to increase their tax­
avoidance aspect. Of course, the Service is not without some defense 
mechanisms in dealing with this sort of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. The Service, as mentioned, does have the authority to revoke 
a ruling after-the-fact if it can show that there were demonstrable 
misstatements in the ruling request. Such misstatements, however, 
may be difficult to identify, much less prove; in any event, issuing such 
a retroactive revocation may be administratively and politically costly. 
Thus, because of the difficulty of combating such adverse selection 
and moral hazard on the part of taxpayers, the Service may have 
determined that it makes more sense for the agency simply to 
withdraw from providing this type of insurance coverage, just as 
private insurance companies sometimes temporarily or permanently 
withdraw from offering certain types of insurance coverage. 
Yet private insurers seem to be willing to fill in some of the gaps 
in tax uncertainty insurance. Why? First, we should not forget that 
the reason may be that insurers are to some extent selling detection 
risk insurance, which the Service obviously has no interest in doing 
and which we want to discourage - hence the proposal to require 
disclosure of the tax risk policies. Putting that possibility to one side, 
which seems reasonable for many of the sorts of transactions currently 
being insured, perhaps the reason is that private insurers are better 
funded and better organized than the Service and have better access 
to exceptionally able tax lawyers to advise them on these issues.125 At 
least some of the largest insurance companies selling tax indemnity 
insurance policies, as a regular part of their tax insurance underwriting 
process, consult a panel of the very best tax lawyers in the business. 
That is, they use expert advisory panels to help them determine if 
particular transactions are likely to be rejected or approved by the 
Service on audit or more importantly by a court in litigation. In this 
way, perhaps private insurance companies are simply better at doing 
ex ante tax transaction risk assessments, which might be thought of as 
ex ante "mini-audits," than is the government. 
If the problem is merely the low quantity and quality of the 
Service's tax lawyers, something could be done about it. Congress 
125 The conventional wisdom among tax practitioners is that Service lawyers are 
in over their heads or "out of their league" at least when it comes to dealing with 
complex tax shelters. Bankman, supra note 7, at 1786 ("A persistent comment of 
private attorneys, speaking in their public-spirited capacity, is the inability of the 
[Service] field staff to correctly apply many of the more complicated tax provisions. 
Many private attorneys believe that auditors are completely out of their league in 
identifying and correctly analyzing tax shelter items."). 
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could simply allocate more money to the Service for hiring attorneys, 
whether they are brought in-house or hired on a contract basis. That 
may well be a good idea. It is possible, in other words, that if 
Congress were to increase the Service's budget dramatically, ear­
marking money to hire more and better lawyers in the Service's Chief 
Counsel's and Deputy Chief Counsel's offices, more private letter 
rulings would be forthcoming - that is, the Service might agree to 
issue rulings in areas of higher legal uncertainty such as those 
involving the application of fact-intensive anti-avoidance standards -
and hence fewer taxpayers would see a need for private tax indemnity 
insurance. Moreover, if we added more and better lawyers to the field 
offices doing the audits, the rate of detection for tax shelter 
transactions might be dramatically increased, which would reduce 
some of our concerns about tax shelter insurance. If adding talented 
personnel were feasible, then it may be an improvement over the 
current state of affairs. We should note, however, that insofar as we 
conceive of the private letter ruling process as a form of government 
provided insurance, it has some of the problems and it lacks some of 
the benefits that we sometimes see with government provided 
insurance. One problem, which is found in most forms of government 
provided insurance, is that the government makes no attempt to 
charge a true premium to the taxpayer-insured, one that roughly 
reflects the risk being shifted to the government. Not charging a risk­
adjusted premium further increases the chance of adverse selection of 
the sort described above.126 Sometimes government provided 
126 Having the Service charge a risk-adjusted premium for issuing an advance 
ruling is not an entirely crazy idea. Whenever the Service settles a tax case and enters 
into a closing agreement, they are in a sense accepting a payment equal to something 
approximating the expected value of the taxpayer's liability. Of course, this is not the 
same thing as, in effect, settling a case before there is a dispute, and doing so on a 
large scale. Even that is not without precedent in the tax area, as the Service already 
has a program for entering into so-called advanced pricing agreements with 
multinational corporations who are concerned about the uncertainty with respect to 
how the Service might resolve transfer-pricing issues, which themselves raise an 
especially fact-intensive set of questions. These advance agreements are a form of 
alternative dispute resolution under which the taxpayers or taxpayer groups avoid ex 
post audits of their transfer prices, and potentially large adjustments, by agreeing in 
advance to use a standard arms-length pricing method. I.RS. Announcement 2005-
27, 2005-16 I.RB. 918 (statement by Matthew W. Franks, director of the Advance 
Pricing Agreement Program, explaining how the program works). Whether this 
system is working as it is supposed to for transfer-pricing issues is beyond the scope of 
this analysis. Whether a similar approach might be used more generally for other 
highly fact-intensive questions of income tax law, especially those involving 
corporations and partnerships, seems unlikely, at least any time soon. To undertake 
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insurance is able to combat adverse selection, in a way that private 
insurance cannot, by making coverage compulsory. Obviously, 
private letter rulings are entirely elective. For all these reasons, the 
adverse selection effect - of aggressive taxpayers trying to take 
advantage of under-priced and elective government-provided tax 
uncertainty insurance - may simply be too much to overcome. 
Nonetheless, the idea of increasing the Service's funding to allow 
it to hire more and better-qualified personnel for conducting analyses 
of ruling requests - and perhaps helping to fund these new personnel 
by significantly increasing the fees that are charged, even if the fees 
are not linked to expected tax liability - might be worth trying. We 
might even consider allowing the Service to use outside tax experts to 
assist them, as insurers have done.127 Having said all of this, however, 
I still see no sound reason to object to a market in privately provided 
tax risk insurance for those domains of tax law uncertainty that 
insurers are willing to enter. Insurance companies are especially 
adept at combating adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
Their use of detailed insurance application procedures, expert 
advisory panels, and the deductibles, policy limits, and numerous 
exclusions in their policies are evidence of this fact. Moreover, having 
private insurers cover these risks provides another advantage over 
government-provided insurance: the private insurers can also provide 
coverage for legal fees, which is no small part of the legal risk being 
insured and which the government cannot reasonably insure. The 
reason the government cannot cover the legal fees is the issue of 
conflict of interest: the government as insurer could not be responsible 
for hiring and supervising the taxpayers' attorneys in the tax dispute. 
The insurer, however, can.128 
such a project on a broader scale would require far more administrative resources 
than the Service has or ever is likely to have. 
127 Other commentators have suggested that allowing the Service to retain elite 
tax lawyers on a contract basis to assist with complex tax shelter cases may be a 
useful, though politically unlikely, response to the problem of Service understaffing. 
See, e.g. , Bankman, supra note 7, at 1787 ("In theory, the government could contract 
with private parties on an incentive-based fee structure to ferret out shelter activity. 
A related . . .  proposal would be to hire outside experts on a non-incentive based fee 
arrangement to train auditors and, perhaps, advise on particular audits or audit­
related issues.") . 
128 There can be conflicts of interest between private insurers and the insured as 
well, especially in settlement negotiations, but these can usually be handled 
contractually or by application of state-law good faith standards and rules of 
professional ethics for lawyers. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the extraordinary length and specificity of the federal tax 
laws, many sophisticated taxpayers face uncertainty as to how their 
transactions will be treated by the Service and the courts. That is, 
although the Code is the quintessential rule-based system of law, as 
opposed to one that relies primarily on vague standards, there remain 
significant areas of legal uncertainty even for those taxpayers able to 
hire tax law experts. The reasons for this are simple enough. First, 
there are a seemingly infinite variety of transactions that taxpayers 
can enter, and the tax laws cannot deal clearly with all of them in 
advance. There will always be gaps and inconsistencies in the tax 
laws. Second, because of these inevitable gaps, the taxing authorities 
will have a strong incentive to use some type of background anti­
avoidance standards - such as the business purpose or economic 
substance standards - to prevent abusive tax avoidance. Both of 
these facts combine to create significant legal uncertainty for the 
sophisticated taxpayer. Such uncertainty can lead to distortions in 
economic activity and is not ideal from a social welfare perspective, 
even though it can serve as a sort of second-best deterrent against 
excessively aggressive tax avoidance. 
The better response to tax law uncertainty is (a) to increase 
penalties or the likelihood of detection to deter abusive tax positions 
and (b) to make available some form of tax law uncertainty insurance. 
Until recently, the only available insurance for this sort of uncertainty 
was the private letter ruling, which serves only a very small portion of 
taxpayers and is explicitly not available, probably for adverse 
selection and moral hazard reasons, for those transactions that involve 
the most legal uncertainty - the ones that involve highly fact specific 
standards-like analyses. A new market of private insurance has arisen 
to cover this category of legal uncertainty, and the question is whether 
it is a bad or a good thing. The concern is that such insurance will not 
be sold to cover positions about which there is legitimate legal 
uncertainty, but for positions that are more likely than not to be 
rejected by the Service and the courts if examined. For those 
positions, tax insurance would be, in effect, audit or detection 
insurance; that would be bad. To prevent this possibility, while at the 
same time allowing the benefits of a private market in tax law 
uncertainty insurance, the Treasury Department probably should 
compel taxpayers who purchase tax risk insurance from a private 
insurer to disclose that fact on their return. This will doubtless raise 
the cost of such insurance and may in the short run hinder the 
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development of the market. In the long run, however, if there is 
strong demand for tax law uncertainty insurance - not just for 
detection-risk insurance - the market should survive and grow. 
Indeed, given the potential efficiency gains from the use of legitimate 
tax law uncertainty insurance, the government should consider ways 
of subsidizing it, at least in the short run. Privately provided tax risk 
insurance not only allows risk-averse taxpayers to shift this 
uncertainty from themselves to risk-neutral insurers, it creates an 
incentive for insurers - and their paid expert tax advisors - to serve 
as a sort of privatized Service. By doing ex ante mini-audits in the 
form of tax risk underwriting, insurers can fill a void that the Service, 
through its letter ruling policies, is unwilling and probably unable to 
fill. 
